Ethiopia: From Anchor to Adrift – Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy Loses Influence Amid Internal Turmoil, Regional Tensions

Addis Abeba — Influenced by its demographic size, geographic location, and historical leadership of Pan-Africanism, Ethiopia plays an anchor role in the regional stability in the Horn and was a champion of African diplomacy on the global stage. However, in recent years, Addis Abeba has been trapped in the crossfire of domestic crises and strained regional ties, which have drained its influence and global posture.

When Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April 2018, Ethiopia’s foreign policy shifted dramatically. His bold moves to ease regional tensions–such as mediating in South Sudan and Sudan, building stronger ties with Gulf nations, and restoring relations with Eritrea–earned praise at home and abroad. These efforts, especially the peace deal with Eritrea, won him the Nobel Peace Prize and positioned Ethiopia once again as a major diplomatic force.

But those early successes soon faded. The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement quickly evolved into a military alliance that helped trigger the civil war in Tigray in November 2020. In that war, the Eritrean Defence Forces fought alongside Ethiopian forces against their common enemy, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The war soon drew in other regional and international actors, each backing different sides, turning it into a broader geopolitical struggle.

The fighting worsened existing tensions in the region, including border tension with Sudan and the ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). These developments strained Ethiopia’s relationships with neighboring countries. The prolonged war in Tigray drained the country’s limited resources and damaged both its regional and international ties. It also weakened the national army, leading to the rise of militant groups and the increasing militarization of Ethiopian society.

Furthermore, webs of violent conflicts across the Oromia, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, and Gambella regions undermine Ethiopia’s influence in the Horn of Africa due to the shift of attention and resources to domestic turmoil, which undermines Ethiopia’s ability to project its power and influence in the region. The war in Tigray and multiple violent insurgencies also drew international condemnation and accusations over gross human rights abuses and war crimes, complicating Ethiopia’s global diplomatic posture.

Deterioration of diplomatic clout, re-orientation of foreign policy

Though the Pretoria peace agreement marked an official end to the war in Tigray, the deeper wounds of political fragmentation, mistrust, and scars remain unhealed. Ethiopia ended the war only to start another conflict in the Amhara region in the aftermath of the Pretoria deal. The lingering vicious circle of violence limited Ethiopia’s capability and credibility to engage in its conventional regional peacekeeping endeavors in the region and beyond. Preoccupied with domestic insurgencies, Ethiopia found no resources or economic means to influence the area and was slowly dislodged from its long-held de facto regional hegemony in the Horn of Africa. This created an opportunity for Kenya to emerge as a beacon of democracy and haven of peace in the Horn of Africa, surpassing Ethiopia.

In May 2024, former U.S. President Joe Biden welcomed Kenyan President William Ruto to the White House for a state visit–the first time in nearly two decades that an African leader received such an honor. During the visit, Kenya was also designated a major non-NATO ally, becoming the first country from sub-Saharan Africa to receive this status. The move elevated Kenya’s standing and diplomatic influence on both the global and regional stages, shifting focus away from Ethiopia.

For years, Ethiopia had been the anchor state of the USA’s Pax Americana in the Horn of Africa. Its large population, growing economy, strategic location, and historical role made it the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in regional security and diplomacy. However, the war in Tigray and a series of violent internal conflicts disrupted this long-standing partnership and weakened Ethiopia’s position on the international stage.

Preoccupied with domestic insurgencies, Ethiopia … was slowly dislodged from its long-held de facto regional hegemony in the Horn of Africa.”

After its initial calls for a ceasefire and negotiated settlement were ignored by the warring parties of the war in Tigray, Washington responded with sanctions and strained diplomatic relations with Addis Abeba. The USA terminated Ethiopia’s duty-free access to the American market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and withheld aid. Following in the footsteps of the USA, the EU also suspended aid to Ethiopia over the gross human rights abuses during the war. The decision has compelled Ethiopia to reorient its foreign policy and ally itself with non-rule-based partners, including the Gulf countries, and elevated its relationship with Türkiye, Russia, and China, which culminated in Ethiopia’s joining of BRICS in January 2024 amidst diplomatic isolation.

Facing pressure from its conventional Western partners over human rights abuses, democratic backsliding, and the humanitarian fallout during the war in Tigray, Ethiopia has pivoted towards the East. This recalibration and reorientation of foreign policy entails deepening economic and transactional ties with China, Russia, Türkiye, and the Gulf states. Yet, this shift is not prompted by long-term strategic interests; rather, it appears to be a reactive move.

While joining the BRICS offers Ethiopia temporary diplomatic leverage and breathing space amidst international sanctions, the bloc cannot serve as an alternative to Western partners with little to no institutional and financial means to cater to Ethiopia’s aspirations. Unlike rule-based liberal multilateral institutions, the BRICS bloc has no shared values to protect nor geographical proximities and demographic affinities but shared enmity towards the Western world and the Bretton Woods institutions. For Ethiopia, joining BRICS may boost its international standing and bring short-term benefits. But it could also place the country in a difficult diplomatic position, forcing it to walk a tightrope between competing global powers. Balancing interests between East and West requires diplomatic agility and clear foreign policy priorities.

Personalization, de-institutionalization of foreign policy

Another explanatory factor that contributed to the crisis of Ethiopian foreign policy in the last few years is the personalization and de-institutionalization of the foreign policy apparatus. Even though the rise of Prime Minister Abiy to the helm of power in 2018 met with international optimism and applause, the subsequent years witnessed the concentration and centralization of foreign policy around the PM, where the key foreign policy decisions reflect his personal ambitions and political calculations. This was prompted by the longing for power consolidation domestically and maneuvering regionally at the expense of long-term national interests and strategic objectives of the country.

The key diplomatic decisions, like thawing relations with Eritrea, joining BRICS, reorienting foreign policy towards Gulf countries, and signing a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, were driven by charisma, bold gestures, and personal calculations by the Prime Minister with little to no rigorous consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and minimum inputs from the diplomatic corps. The personalization of foreign policy has also led to a foreign policy driven more by political calculation than institutional processes, overshadowing the institutional role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reinforcing personalization of diplomacy.

Personal charisma and bold gestures may offer a short-term advantage of power consolidation at home, yet they compromise the long-term national interests and strategic objectives by turning the foreign policy into a reactive, personal, and political tool. There is no doubt that the prime minister is the top diplomat of the country, but foreign policy demands continuity, credibility, and institutional memory over impulses of personal convenience.

Furthermore, the de-institutionalisation of foreign policy undermines institutional autonomy, diplomatic integrity, and the professional ethos of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Compounding this issue is the constant reshuffling of ministers and key figures at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over the past seven years, Ethiopia has reshuffled its foreign minister five times, with the latest appointment being Gedion Timotheos in October 2024. This frequent turnover has weakened continuity, eroded institutional memory, and damaged credibility in foreign policy-making, leaving international partners confused and uncertain. The constant turnover of key officials and senior diplomats resulted in the diminishing of the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, weakening institutional vitality, and eroding foreign policy coherence.

The sporadic reshuffles of ministers and key officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are a strategic misstep that undermines diplomatic integrity.”

Concurrent with sporadic reshuffles of ministers and key officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another strategic misstep that undermines diplomatic integrity: the appointment of loyalist military and political figures to ambassadorial positions and the sidelining of skilled and career diplomats, which signals the militarization and politicization of foreign policy. Such an appointment also undermines meritocracy, erodes the credibility of the Ethiopian missions, and drains institutional memory due to the departure of professional diplomats. The political and military figures with no hands-on diplomatic experience face stark difficulties in prudently navigating the delicate diplomatic landscape amidst polarized global geopolitics.

Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, GERD disputes, and regional tensions

Ethiopia became a landlocked country in the early 1990s following the secession of Eritrea. Since then, Ethiopia has embarked on a journey to explore the available opportunities to secure dependable seaport access, albeit not easily. Tension escalated in the Horn of Africa region following Ethiopia’s assertive tone regarding unfettered and dependable access to sea outlets, which has been echoing since October 2023. This irked the littoral states of the region and brought the regional tension to a new high involving neighboring countries like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea.

On 01 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that grants Ethiopia access to a naval base along 20 km of Somaliland’s coast to be leased for 50 years in exchange for the recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. However, the MoU sparked controversy, straining the Addis Abeba-Mogadishu relations, as the latter regards the MoU as an act of aggression.

Pursuit of sea access serves as a unifying factor, while GERD stands as a symbol of its national pride at home, even as it disrupts the geopolitical balance in the region by straining Ethiopia’s relations with neighboring countries, including Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Egypt. GERD continues to be a major source of tension in the Horn of Africa and among Nile Basin nations, as repeated negotiations have failed to produce a comprehensive agreement on its filling and operation, further damaging Ethiopia’s ties with Sudan and Egypt.