Ethiopia: Appointment of New Interim President in Tigray: Tactical Decision or Misreading of Reality?

Addis Abeba — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has appointed Lt. General Tadesse Worede as President of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), replacing Getachew Reda. This development has diffused tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government. While numerous diplomats and observers have expressed relief at the appointment of Lt. General Tadesse, I contend that such a reaction constitutes a gross misreading of the reality.

TIA was established as per the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed in Pretoria, South Africa, between the federal government and TPLF. COHA, supplemented by another in Nairobi, Kenya, envisaged, among others, a lasting settlement to the conflict, a framework for accountability, restoration of constitutional order, withdrawal of non-ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Force) troops from Western Tigray and other occupied areas, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) of Tigrayan combatants, among other elements.

Previously, the TPLF held a majority of seats within the composition of the interim administration, as well as the presidency. In an unexpected development, the TPLF Central Committee nominated Getachew Reda for the presidency over the candidate supported by the party’s older leadership. The latter group grew increasingly dissatisfied with Getachew’s unwillingness to comply with their directives. By August, a faction led by Chairperson Debretsion Gebremichael claimed to have expelled Getachew’s faction from the party. However, as any replacement required the consent of the federal government, Getachew remained in office until the recent appointment of Lt. General Tadesse.

The armed actor involved in this saga, Tigray Forces, though awaiting DDR, had nonetheless been allotted a fifth of the seats in TIA’s Cabinet, while its units operated parallel to, often overriding, civilian police and militia forces. Tigray military forces emerged in the initial months of the two-year war as a resistance to the atrocities committed by Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Amharan forces. However, its top leadership, comprised of former TPLF combatants from the pre-1991 era, had trouble staying clear of partisan politics. Their last January declaration endorsed Debretsion’s faction’s demand for the ouster of Getachew and his allies. Several generals and colonels opposed to this move were suspended from their posts, and dissent among younger officers was demonstrated through desertion.

After the federal government declined the request by Debretsion’s faction to replace the president, officers of the Tigray military forces attempted to impose a fait accompli by storming local administration offices and expelling Getachew’s supporters. When the former president left the region last month, Lt. General Tadesse assumed the role of acting president by default.

The federal government has been consistently setting the narrative for some time. Following the January declaration by the officers of Tigray Forces, Prime Minister Abiy issued two statements in Tigrigna addressed to “the Tigrayan people and elite,” implicitly accusing the TPLF of having a propensity for violence. The foreign minister’s briefing to the diplomatic community accused a faction within the TPLF of attempting to dismantle TIA and collaborating with hostile external forces. An earlier article by the former president of Ethiopia made similar accusations against “a faction of the TPLF and its armed supporters.”

Fears of a renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also a contributing factor. Although the two were allies during the war in Tigray, their relationship deteriorated after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), which Eritrea believes ended the war prematurely. Rumors now circulate about clandestine meetings between TPLF and Eritrean officials, though both parties deny such claims. This development positions Tigray as a strategically significant area once again.

The months-long propaganda delegitimizing Getachew has been too pervasive to be easily backpedaled. From labeling the appointment of TIRA’s president as the installation of a “viceroy” to presenting the DDR process as a conspiracy against Tigray, various issues requiring flexibility and collaboration have been demonized, thereby creating ample opportunities for any faction to exploit.

The militarization of TPLF is a key development that has yet to be flagged by most observers. The party is now a shadow of its former self, as evidenced by low turnouts at its rallies last January and February. The past months observed overt pleas to Tigray military forces to suppress intra-party and public dissent, marking a power shift. A party that historically held its armed forces accountable to the political leadership has become reliant on and hardly distinguishable from the military officers, who have now turned into de facto administrators in local administrations. As a sign of what the future holds, in the weeks following Getachew’s departure, Tadesse held multiple meetings with the officers of Tigray Forces but none with the civilian cabinet.

The installation of a new interim administration with a new president and cabinet is nothing but an episode in a poker game the two sides have embarked on. TPLF had strongly opposed Prime Minister Abiy’s public call for the Tigray people to suggest a nominee for president by email, implying unitary power of appointment, but had been quiet since. Had the composition of the new TIA cabinet followed this approach, it would infuriate them further, as Debretsion’s faction would not acquire the majority and Tigray military forces would lose their seats.

Among the tasks officially assigned to Tadesse in the inauguration to which the TPLF was not invited, the expedited implementation of DDR and the opening of political space would contradict the rationale behind removing the former president from the TIA. Whereas, the tasks of halting “unconstitutional relations and activities” and the return of IDPs without mention of occupied territories would create disagreements. TPLF hardliners would have found reasons to oppose the new TIA anyway, as they had determined from the get-go that a well-performing, inclusive administration undermines TPLF’s claim as the sole savior of the people.

TPLF leaders may hope to control Tadesse and the new cabinet through loyalists within the Tigray Forces and their supporters in the administration, as they did with Getachew. However, this approach would likely paralyze the Tigray military forces and undermine the unity of its command. If such a scenario were to materialize, it would likely precipitate further fragmentation, multiplication of unchecked fiefdoms, and violent confrontations.

The negative feedback loop of the federal government and Tigrayan forces and their propensity to militarized calculations do not exist in a vacuum, nor are they impossible to untangle. The spoilers of peace in both camps are empowered by the failure to adopt a mindset befitting the post-COHA dispensation and the lack of progress on key issues of the latter. Despite the signing of the COHA, neither side made the necessary pivot.

The federal government–and the Prosperity Party–has yet to engage in genuine soul-searching. Its lack of foothold in the Tigrayan community emanates from its inability and unwillingness to recognize Tigrayan nationalism, to admit the abhorrence of involving Eritrean and Amhara forces in the war, and to end the occupation of Tigrayan territories. Instead, it attributes everything to TPLF’s maneuvers and to holding onto a cat-and-mouse game, hoping the real issues could eventually be swept under the rug. A short-sighted perspective, hardly in the interest of sustainable peace.