African-led diplomacy struggles to find answers to DRC

War has engulfed the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2025. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group have captured strategic cities in both North and South Kivu provinces from DRC government forces and threatened to move further west. Millions of Congolese are currently displaced. In late February, DRC Prime Minister Judith Suminwa told the Human Rights Council in Geneva that 7,000 had been killed since January

The African Union (AU) backed Luanda Process was launched in 2022 with the goal of achieving peace in the region through diplomatic channels. The DRC and M23 were scheduled to begin talks on March 18 in the Angolan capital following significant diplomatic efforts. But at the last minute, the rebel group pulled out, citing sanctions that the European Union had placed on their senior members on March 17.

Shortly after the cancelled talks, the President of Angola, João Lourenço, said that his role as mediator in the conflict would come to an end. “Angola recognises the need to free itself from the responsibility of mediating this conflict…in order to more comprehensively focus on the general priorities established by the continental organisation,” the presidency said in a statement.

Just days later, on March 23, DRC president Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame opened direct talks in Doha brokered by the Emir of Qatar. The leaders called for an “immediate ceasefire” at the talks, the first time the two leaders had met since M23 rebels stepped up their offensive.

In April, M23 pulled out of the captured city of Wale Kale, in what appeared to be a gesture of goodwill before they too joined the peace talks in Doha. On 24 April, the DRC and M23 agreed to halt fighting in the east of the country until peace talks mediated by Qatar reach their “conclusion”.

Why has African mediation failed?

Why did Qatari-brokered talks have more success than the Luanda Process? Fidel Owusu, an international relations analyst for Ghana-based DefSEC Analytics, says that ultimately Angola did not have the clout to get conflicting parties to commit to meaningful dialogue.

“In any negotiations or mediation, you need a mediator that has weight, and carries some carrots and sticks. This makes the parties aware that if they refuse to do certain things, the mediator is likely to act in a particular way. When there are rewards and punishments, the parties become more disciplined and focused on their commitments.”

“Lourencõ has great respect in the region, and Angola has built its wealth with its vast oil resources, but at the end of the day, it does not carry the necessary weight, and Lourencõ does not have enough carrots and sticks.”

By contrast, Qatar has invested significantly in both Rwanda and the DRC, especially Rwanda, where Qatar Airways has agreed to take a 60% stake in the $1.3bn new international airport. This gives Doha leverage and strong incentive to engage, as reputational risks stemming from Rwanda’s backing for the M23 could also impact on Qatar.

“Right now, people being associated with Rwanda is a huge reputational risk. Large football clubs like Arsenal, PSG and Bayern have been urged to drop their partnerships with the country which would be damaging to Rwanda and to those with economic interests in the country,” Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks, tells African Business.

Daniel van Dalen, senior analyst at Signal Risk, said that M23 also called into question Luanda’s role as an honest broker in the talks, perceiving a closeness between the Angola and DRC governments.

Angola is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which deployed troops in Eastern Congo until its mandate was terminated in mid-March following the deaths of 18 of its troops, including 14 from South Africa.

“Angola was viewed by M23 and Rwanda as more partial to the DRC. And the Luanda process was seen as a SADC-led process, although (that is) not entirely true. SADC also deployed troops in Eastern Congo, and so it was seen as a sort of hostile power.”

Before that, DRC believed that the EAC (East African Community) led Nairobi Process, an alternative peace effort, was biased towards Rwanda. In February, analysts from the Institute for Security Studies said that DRC and Rwanda had been “forum shopping” with the Nairobi and Luanda processes – “favouring mediators perceived to support their side.”

“AU processes are difficult because there is almost always a perception of bias from one side,” says van Dalen. “Finding an impartial mediator in perception has been very difficult on the continent as geopolitical blocs and small alliances form. The AU itself is having less and less ability to mediate.”

Not entirely futile

However, the Angolan peace effort has not been entirely futile. Ochieng says the process created a crucial channel for communication between the parties.

“Having a constant anchor point for this conflict was definitely important, if it was not there, then there would have been no one to hold either party to account,” she says.

More than that, it has created an important framework for disengaging conflicting forces in the region, which will be useful in the longer term, van Dalen says. “The EAC (East African Community) and SADC framework being developed will be a guiding force in developing a longer term solution. External mediators can definitely help to get initial steps forward, and that’s what we are seeing here.”

The AU, recognising the need to keep the momentum of their peace efforts, launched a new mediation process headed by the President of Togo, Faure Gnassingbe, and facilitated by a number of former African leaders appointed by the SADC and EAC.

Whether this will be a successful remains to be seen, says Owusu. “It comes down again to the carrot and stick theory. There is a lack of leverage, there is a lack of what can you give me for having talks with my enemy? If Angola could not achieve peace, then I don’t see the Togo president achieving it.”

Washington builds on Qatari efforts

While African mediation attempts have stuttered, Qatar’s mediation has reached a diplomatic breakthrough over recent weeks. Not only have they brought the DRC, Rwanda, and M23 to direct talks, but they also led to the April 23rd ceasefire while the parties work towards a permanent truce.

Recent efforts have also been bolstered by the role of the United States. On April 25, representatives from DRC and Rwanda signed a declaration of principles and agreed to work towards reaching a draft peace agreement by 2nd May. They also committed to respected each other’s sovereignty and “territorial integrity.”

At gatherings this year, African leaders have repeatedly called for increased cooperation between African countries, but with interstate tensions prevalent in several regions of the continent, the goal remains more of an aspiration than a reality. The inability of African countries and the AU to succeed in DR Congo mediation – while brokers like Qatar and the US yield results – are a setback for the cause of continental unity. That lack of unity, says Owusu, could also impact economic integration through mechanisms like the African Continental Free Trade Area.

“Sometimes leaders say that we should separate politics from economics, and that the African continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is likely to lead to regional growth without the need of talking about politics. Yet, in Africa most of the countries have governments tied in with the economies.”

Crédito: Link de origem