Abiy and Isaias Fight Over Tigray

A struggle is underway to control Tigray’s military forces

More than two years have passed since the Tigray war ended with the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), commonly referred to as the Pretoria Agreement. While neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea publicly declared outright victory, the concept of victory held different meanings for each country.

For Ethiopia, triumph was framed around the defeat of what it labeled as Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces. For Eritrea, success was measured by the weakening of the TPLF and the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), as well as the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).

According to Alex de Waal, Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki considered the TPLF and the ENDF as the two main obstacles to his influence over Ethiopia. As de Waal explains, “His two biggest fears are the Ethiopian army and the TPLF,” who until the war ended in November 2022 were “locked in mutual annihilation.” The Tigray war provided Isaias with the opportunity to weaken the TPLF and indirectly neutralize the ENDF—a strategy he successfully executed.

As the Pretoria Agreement took shape, Isaias hoped the war would continue indefinitely, allowing him to further weaken the TDF and keep Ethiopia in a state of perpetual instability. However, the agreement compelled him to withdraw his forces from much of Tigray—a significant setback. In a subsequent interview with Eritrea’s national television, Isaias vented his frustration, using the word “Tekolifna” (roughly, “we have been frustrated”) to describe how the agreement derailed his plans.

Assab Issue

What began as an unholy alliance has since seen relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorate significantly, culminating in the suspension of flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Ethiopia’s state media began airing discussions on why the nation of more than 100 million people deserves port ownership.

Despite promises of access to Assab Port after the Tigray war, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was left empty-handed. This likely felt like a profound betrayal to Abiy who had recently revived the country’s navy and inaugurated a road to Assab.

On the 129th Anniversary of the Adwa Victory, General Birhanu Jula, Chief of General Staff of the ENDF, declared that “it is only a matter of time before Ethiopia becomes a member of the Red Sea community.”

Reports indicate that both Ethiopia and Eritrea have mobilized troops along their shared border, heightening tensions in the region. General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a vice president of Tigray’s interim administration, recently warned, “At any moment war between Ethiopia and Eritrea could break out.”

Calculated Gamble

This raises the critical question of whether Ethiopia will resort to military force to annex Assab. In my view, the answer is both ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’ Due to Isaias’s strategic maneuvering during the Tigray War—where Eritrea used ENDF troops as cannon fodder—and ongoing conflicts across Ethiopia, the ENDF is now overstretched and poses no significant threat to Eritrea.

This is further compounded by Ethiopia’s domestic challenges, including skyrocketing inflation and other pressing issues. This leads to another pressing question: Why does Ethiopia seek to annex Assab Port if it lacks the military capability to do so? The answer lies in Ethiopia’s intention to rely on the TDF.

For Abiy, gaining control over the TDF depends on dismantling the TPLF through Tigray’s interim administration and leveraging the Pretoria Agreement to demobilize TDF soldiers. Initially, there was hope that Getachew Reda’s interim administration would facilitate the agreement’s implementation. Instead, it seems he has been co-opted by Abiy to achieve objectives he could not accomplish militarily—chief among them, the dismantling of the TPLF and demobilizing the TDF.

While the TPLF has largely fulfilled its commitments under the agreement, the federal government has failed to ensure even the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The interim administration, now closely aligned with Abiy, is accused of betraying the people of Tigray and creating conditions that fuel internal conflict. Getachew has exploited the threat of a relapse to war to buy time, allowing the federal government to undermine the agreement.

Should Abiy succeed, the consequences for Tigray would be catastrophic, as it would enable him to re-mobilize Tigrayan forces and wage war against Eritrea. Abiy is highly unlikely to declare war on Eritrea unless he first secures Tigrayan support.

TPLF-Isaias Alliance?

From Isaias’s perspective, the ENDF no longer poses a threat to Eritrea, as he successfully neutralized what was once considered Africa’s strongest army without direct confrontation. However, Isaias’ worst nightmare is the possibility of Abiy leveraging Tigrayan forces to attack Eritrea. Annexing Assab Port would require Abiy to wage war on multiple fronts, overstretching Eritrea’s military—a scenario that could only materialize if Abiy uses the TDF to engage Eritrean forces along Tigray’s shared border with Eritrea.

Recently, rumors have surfaced suggesting that senior members of the TDF met with Eritrean military officers in Eritrea. TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael and Getachew have confirmed that the first post-war meeting between the TPLF, represented by Getachew, and representatives from Eritrea—took place in a third country. This meeting was held following a suggestion and with the explicit approval of Abiy.

Although it has not been confirmed whether this initial meeting was followed by discussions between TDF leaders and Eritrean officers, such collaboration would align with the shared interests of both parties. Primary it would serve to prevent Abiy from leveraging Tigrayan forces to wage war against Eritrea—a scenario that would benefit neither Tigray nor Eritrea. Furthermore, a potential partnership between Tigrayan and Eritrean leaders could act as a deterrent against any military action by Abiy, who has shown reluctance to implement his obligations under the Pretoria Agreement.

TPLF leaders and TDF commanders have a responsibility to ensure the TDF is not co-opted by either side. The people of Tigray, who lost loved ones to genocide and war, cannot endure another conflict—especially one involving the very forces responsible for mass killings, starvation, and rape over two years ago. Another war risks erasing Tigrayans entirely, a people already pushed to the brink of survival.

Controversial Administration

Within Tigray, the Getachew-led interim administration and Debretsion’s TPLF have little room for negotiation. In reality, the administration serves as little more than a tool in the broader political battle between Abiy and the TPLF. The blame for deliberately delaying the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement—and fueling the ensuing rivalry between the interim administration and the TPLF—lies squarely with Abiy’s government.

On 12 March, the interim administration called for “necessary assistance” from the federal government—the same forces implicated in the Tigray genocide. It also called on the youth to organize and confront TDF commanders, accusing them of attempting to “dismantle the interim administration from top to bottom.” The following day, Getachew held a media briefing in Addis Ababa, where he echoed Abiy’s talking points.

In a move that drew widespread criticism, Getachew shamelessly shifted blame for the non-implementation of the Pretoria Agreement—particularly the failure to ensure the safe return of IDPs to their homes—from federal government to his rivals in Tigray, the Debretsion-led TPLF. This appeared designed to alienate his Tigrayan rivals both domestically and internationally, while also easing international pressure on Abiy to fulfill his obligations under the agreement.

During the media briefing, Getachew sought to justify federal intervention to prop up his administration, disregarding how the people of Tigray might react to the presence of federal soldiers in the region. Inviting these forces to maintain law and order has been widely viewed by many Tigrayans, both within the region and in the diaspora, as an act of treason. Many still vividly recall the brutality of ENDF soldiers during the war in Tigray and see this move as a betrayal of their trust.

Shifting Blame

Getachew’s briefing has left many questioning whether the interim administration truly represents the people of Tigray or merely serves as an extension of Abiy’s Prosperity Party. Both Abiy and Getachew appear singularly focused on demobilizing Tigrayan forces before addressing the safe return of IDPs or restoring Western Tigray. This strategy appears to stem from the calculation that a disarmed TPLF, as a signatory to the agreement, would be easier to dismantle, paving the way for the agreement’s non-implementation.

On 14 March, during a briefing to members of the diplomatic community in Addis Ababa, Getachew once again seized the opportunity to shift blame for the delay in returning IDPs. He accused his rivals in Tigray of “standing in the way of a possible return of IDPs”, implicitly calling for reduced international pressure on the federal government. “The ball was in our court…it would be very unfair for me to continue to blame the federal government,” he stated.

However, General Tadesse Werede, another interim administration vice president, disagreed. He asserted, “We have discharged our responsibility 100 percent,” adding that progress stalled because “the safety of the returnees could not be guaranteed.” Tadesse emphasized, “It is not right to absolve the federal government of responsibility.”

As Ethiopia and Eritrea discreetly beat the drums of war and Abiy works covertly to prop up an administration fully controlled by him, Tigray’s future hangs in the balance. Global powers, particularly the U.S., need to act decisively to prevent war then ensure full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. Tigrayans deserve nothing less than a peace that can only be achieved through its rapid and complete fulfilment.

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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

Main photo: Abiy and Isaias visiting Ethiopian Air Force facilities weeks before the start of the Tigray War. Abiy Ahmed Ali X account, 14 October 2020.

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