AG Remarks: Antitrust Enforcement in the Era of Checks and Balances Federalism (Sept. 15, 2026) – Colorado Attorney General
Georgetown Antitrust Symposium Keynote (September 15, 2026)
In the antitrust world, federalism is having an important moment. This moment is 50 years in the making, as the Hart Scott Rodino (“HSR”) Act, passed in 1976, envisions that states will act as partners in antitrust enforcement. As the Supreme Court stated, the role of states in antitrust enforcement “was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting competition.”[1] What is different now is that states are no longer acting as a junior partner; indeed, with respect to a number of important matters, the states are acting alone. And at a time of increasing levels of consolidation and market power across the economy, vigorous antitrust enforcement is more important than ever—and states (whether acting individually or as a multistate coalition) are positioned to play an important role even when forced to go it alone, without a federal partner.
For the last 50 years, until somewhat recently, the federal government cooperated with states and ensured that the HSR Act’s procedural structure governed antitrust enforcement in a manner that protected the role of states as well as the federal government. That era, unfortunately, is now on pause. Notably, since U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division Chief Gail Slater left her role, the federal government has become an unreliable and inconsistent partner in antitrust enforcement, with a disturbing number of high-profile examples of the DOJ making enforcement decisions based on political concerns, White House pressure, or lobbying clout, not on the merits of the case.
Under the current administration, the proud tradition of DOJ independence is under assault and antitrust enforcement is subject to political pressures not seen since Watergate. These lobbying pressures have led to former Trump DOJ officials criticizing the elevation of a “rule of lobbying” over the rule of law.[2] Moreover, Stanley Woodward, the Associate Attorney General who oversees the antitrust division, has given the explicit and public direction for the division to avoid trials,[3] thereby weakening the DOJ’s bargaining leverage, making it a less effective enforcer and, of course, potentially allowing harm to competition to go unchallenged.
The DOJ’s abdication of leadership in antitrust does not mean that effective and reliable antitrust enforcement has disappeared. Rather, states are now playing an essential role in antitrust enforcement by picking up the baton dropped by the federal government. To be sure, the envisioned and preferable mode of antitrust enforcement is where state enforcers closely collaborate with the federal government to ensure robust antitrust enforcement, following a model of “cooperative federalism.” But federalism also means that state enforcers can act as a critical check when the federal government fails operating in a manner we might call “checks and balances federalism.”
In today’s world of checks and balances federalism where the federal government is failing to make antitrust enforcement decisions on the merits, it merits reflection on how the HSR system works—and does not work—for state antitrust enforcement. In my talk today, I will reflect on this question and how the current system needs to be reconsidered. To that end, I will first discuss the traditional model of antitrust enforcement as part of a system of cooperative federalism, I will next discuss today’s model of checks and balances federalism, and I will close by evaluating what changes we need to make to antitrust laws to accommodate the realities of a checks and balances federalism.
I. How Cooperative Federalism Works
When the federal government operates in good faith, state enforcers work together with federal enforcers to investigate conduct and proposed transactions to make antitrust enforcement decisions on the merits. This type of collaboration allows the states to share local insights with their federal counterparts, creates the opportunity for dialogue between federal and state enforcers, and enables more effective enforcement. In practice, this means that the states often bring cases together with the DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), providing a local perspective, adding state law claims, and often recovering damages that can go directly into the pockets of harmed citizens or back to the state to redress the harm on a more collective basis—in many cases, with more ability than the DOJ or FTC possesses. In other cases, states can rely on the DOJ or the FTC to bring a case, especially if the case has strong national impacts, so they can focus their limited resources elsewhere.
Consider, for example, a case of cooperative federalism in action from the first Trump administration. In 2017, UnitedHealthcare, through its subsidiary Optum, announced plans to acquire DaVita Medical Group, a healthcare provider operating in six states, including Colorado.[4] Concerned about the competitive impacts of the merger, the FTC and Colorado each launched investigations, working collaboratively to assess the potential impact on consumers. The federal investigation raised concerns for some markets, but not for Colorado; by contrast, my office had a different theory of the merger’s harm in Colorado than the FTC. Consequently, we decided to move forward independently of the FTC. Even when proceeding independently, we continued coordinating with the FTC, which respected our role, shared information with us, and operated in good faith at every step of the way. Ultimately, we were able to reach an agreement with the merging parties to address our concerns. We filed our consent judgement on the same day the FTC filed theirs, enabling the merging parties to close their deal and approach the antitrust review process in a predictable manner.[5]
I am a firm believer that cooperative federalism and a collaborative relationship with the federal government provides the best model for antitrust enforcement. For another illustration of this model, consider our recent challenge to the Kroger/Albertsons merger, which Colorado and Washington challenged in state court and the FTC (along with a coalition of states) challenged in federal district court in Oregon.[6] In that matter, we conducted a thorough investigation in partnership with Washington State, the FTC, and a coalition of other states. In our lawsuit, we highlighted local facts and approached our case differently than the FTC—notably, we also pled a no-poach and non-solicitation claim. It was a powerful and effective example of cooperative federalism. And when the merging companies argued that our litigation was inappropriate and preempted, the DOJ filed a brief making the case that our action should go forward, consistent with the cooperative federalism model of antitrust enforcement.[7]
II. Current Environment: Checks and Balances Federalism
As I noted above, the current administration is no longer a reliable and consistent partner in merits-based antitrust enforcement. Take, for example, our case against Live Nation where the DOJ, along with 40 states, brought monopolization claims against the live entertainment behemoth. Heading into trial, the DOJ was leading on each of the federal claims, had worked out a witness list, had assigned and written witness examinations, and was set to aggressively try the case. One week into trial, however, the DOJ settled its claims on highly suspect terms,[8] leaving the states scrambling. As we later learned in a highly irregular and concerning report, the settlement negotiations were driven not by the DOJ staff focused on the merits, but by the White House Counsel’s office, and that the settlement was finalized after Michael Rapino, the CEO of Live Nation, met personally with President Trump.[9]
To appreciate how inadequate the DOJ settlement is, consider that it fails to redress the harms alleged in the complaint. Rather than imposing meaningful relief, it extends an existing, largely ineffective consent decree for another eight years,[10] even after Live Nation previously violated the requirements of that same decree.[11] Most of the states who had previously been litigating alongside the DOJ quickly concluded that the settlement was inadequate and a bipartisan coalition of 34 states continued litigating the case and won at trial. Because the states were able to act as a check on the DOJ’s politically driven settlement, Live Nation was declared an illegal monopolist in federal court by a jury of citizens and the bipartisan state coalition is now pursuing meaningful relief from the court.
III. Antitrust Laws are not Currently Optimized for Checks and Balances Federalism
By its very nature, merger enforcement is often aimed at firms with market power, typically the largest firms, that are well positioned to wield undue influence in the corridors of government. This makes it particularly important that states be empowered to step in when the federal government fails to live up to its antitrust enforcement responsibilities. The procedural system for antitrust law currently rests on the premise that the federal government is operating in good faith and in a trustworthy manner. Even in cases like the Davita case discussed above, a federal agency can disagree with the view of a state enforcer and operate in a compatible and trusted manner. But in some recent cases, the federal government has operated in an opaque, politically-driven, and untrustworthy manner that has left state enforcers in a challenging situation, where gaps in the HSR enforcement regime have left states in the position of having to race to the courthouse when the federal government suddenly drops the ball.
For state enforcers, a painful turning point in how to view the federal government as a potential partner was the proposed merger of Nexstar and TEGNA, two major television broadcast companies. This merger promises to create the largest broadcast station group in the United States, significantly impacting the delivery of news and other media to Americans nationwide and raising prices to consumers across the nation. In Denver, for example, the merger would create a dominant local broadcast station with over 57% of the market in the hands of a single company, making the merger presumptively illegal under established antitrust standards.[12] Nonetheless, after President Trump called for the merger to be approved in a social media post,[13] both the DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) ignored established standards and precedents in quickly approving the merger.[14]
For a bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general concerned about this merger, the failure of the Department of Justice and the FCC to follow its established standards and procedures created a dilemma. In the face of President Trump’s social media post, state AGs were faced with a critical challenge—how to proceed with a serious investigation and potential challenge to a merger where the federal government appeared set to approve the merger in rapid response to White House pressure and without a rigorous review of the merits of the transaction. This situation posed a considerable challenge to the states because, unlike the federal government, the states had no tools under the HSR Act to delay or prevent the parties from closing the deal—other than filing a lawsuit and obtaining a temporary restraining order.
A coalition of state AGs filed a lawsuit to prevent the Nexstar/Tegna merger from closing on the eve of the federal agency approvals and requested a temporary restraining order to stop the merger. Immediately after receiving the federal approvals, even in the face of the state lawsuit (and a parallel one filed by DirecTV), the parties stated that they were closing the merger. Just days after the closing, the court ruled, issuing a temporary restraining order and, in short order, a preliminary injunction against integrating TEGNA into Nexstar. But rather than honor the letter and spirit of the court’s ruling, Nexstar installed a TEGNA board composed entirely of Nexstar executives and former executives, once again, seeking to frustrate the ability of the states to enforce the antitrust laws. The court evaluated this action and sharply criticized the conduct of the company, concluding that “it is shocking that [Nexstar] think[s] installing a Board of Directors comprised primarily of Nexstar executives would not create influence over Tegna management.”[15]
The HSR regime assumes that the federal government will operate in good faith, ensuring a full and fair review of mergers on the merits. In the past, as in the Davita case mentioned above, that even meant providing support for state review of mergers on theories not embraced by the federal government. But with a DOJ acting in a lawless and unpredictable manner, states must conduct our own investigations, often without the benefit of the federal government’s HSR powers, and sometimes must seek last-minute temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions to prevent mergers from being consummated without effective review. Significantly, this environment is burdensome not just to state enforcers, but also to the courts, who are pressed to conduct expedited proceedings to evaluate complex transactions.
To appreciate how the new posture of the federal government changes the equation for states, consider the proposed merger of Warner Bros. Discovery and Paramount Skydance. Learning from the experience in the Nexstar case, state regulators wasted no time suing to block the transaction from proceeding and to secure judicial relief before the merger would be able to close.[16] Under the HSR regime managed by the federal government, there would normally be more time for more back-and-forth before rushing to litigation. But in a binary world where the states need to be worried about another Nexstar/Tegna scenario, and where there is no statutory mechanism for states to manage the timing of the review of a transaction, the states filed a lawsuit quickly to protect our ability to stop the merger and retain jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws.
IV. The Procedural Side of Antitrust
In most conversations on antitrust law, the focus is often on the substance of the analysis, such as the appropriate standard with respect to vertical mergers. But the procedural side of antitrust is significant, as discussed above. In the wake of Watergate, Congress passed not only the HSR Act, but also the Tunney Acy, a law meant to address the “pay-to-play politics” employed by the Nixon White House.[17] Indeed, one reporter published a leaked memo from “I.T.T. lobbyist, Dita Beard, which indicated that the $400,000 pledge for the RNC convention was in exchange for the DOJ’s anti-trust settlement.”[18]
For most of its history, the Tunney Act remained an instrument mostly left on the shelf. In one of the first major Tunney Act challenges since the law’s enactment, Colorado, along with a coalition of states, took on the settlement of a case, on the eve of trial, challenging the merger between Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) and Juniper Networks.[19] In that case, the Department had a compelling case that the merger was anticompetitive based on well-established, generally accepted measures of market concentration.[20] But the merger challenge was dropped because, as former DOJ official Roger Alford said, lobbyists were allowed to “exert and expand their influence and enrich themselves”[21] and political appointees refused to allow the Department to conduct its work on the merits. The action in the HPE/Juniper case thus departed from principle long followed by the Antitrust Division: “[W]e care about the quality and professional integrity of the lawyers and economists that appear before us, not their stature in the antitrust bar or their political affiliation or background. We do not plan to hash out merger settlements over martinis.”[22]
As part of the challenge to the HPE/Juniper settlement under the Tunney Act, the states took discovery—including depositions of some of the key lobbyists—and submitted briefing and expert affidavits to assist the court in its Tunney Act review. As the court itself concluded, the states’ discovery confirmed an even more distressing set of facts than had been publicly reported, including that antitrust division staff had previously rejected what became the DOJ/HPE settlement. Moreover, that discovery revealed that lobbyist Mike Davis threatened to “destroy” Gail Slater over her handling of the case, that Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward directly took control of the settlement process at the behest of HPE and its lobbyists and quickly agreed to everything that HPE had asked for in its original settlement, and that HPE itself ghost-wrote the “competitive impact statement” that the Tunney Act mandates from the DOJ. Finally, the discovery revealed that former Department of Justice officials Alford and Rinner were told that they were fired from the DOJ as punishment for objecting to the settlement.
In its opinion, the court concluded that the DOJ had violated the plain text of the Tunney Act by not disclosing the contacts of several HPE lobbyists with the executive branch and by not disclosing all of the remedies that were considered by the United States, such as DOJ antitrust staff’s proposed divestiture or various non-antitrust promises that HPE offered. It also strongly suggested that it would have found in favor of the DOJ at trial. Nonetheless, despite clear evidence that the settlement was obtained through improper means, that the DOJ failed to comply with the Tunney Act, and that DOJ’s case was quite strong, the court held that the settlement was in the public interest. In particular, the court concluded that the settlement was in the public interest largely because “the United States could choose to walk away entirely from its challenge to the proposed acquisition if the settlement is not approved,”[23] a rationale that largely guts the Tunney Act as a check on DOJ abuses. And, in a perverse result, the court excused the DOJ’s failure to comply with the Tunney Act as “harmless error” because the states had discovered that failure and brought it to light.
The district court’s ruling is both perplexing and frustrating. Nonetheless, given the amount of work on our plate, state attorneys general do not have the resources to fight every fight to the bitter end and we are thus not appealing this decision. We are still proud that, in this case, we made plain the corruption of the merger review process that took place and we demonstrated our commitment to defend the rule of law. Going forward, we will continue to evaluate opportunities to improve the processes of antitrust enforcement, including looking to Congress to act based on the conclusion of this case.
With a new Congress, we will look for opportunities to make innovations to the Tunney Act and to the HSR Act itself. For starters, weighing a corrupt and insufficient antitrust settlement against the possibility of corrupt abandonment cannot be the standard envisioned by Congress when it passed the Tunney Act. To address that failing, Congress will need to revisit the Tunney Act and develop more effective strategies for advancing its core purposes, including clarifying that a failure to comply with the Tunney Act process is a sufficient reason to reject a settlement. Without a full ability to evaluate the corruption of merits-based antitrust enforcement and any consequences for violating the law, the Tunney Act’s requirements will be hollow as there won’t be any incentive for compliance.
In revising the Tunney Act, Congress should extend its terms to the FTC. Traditionally, the FTC was a bipartisan agency with built-in safeguards because those of the opposite party could criticize actions they disagreed with. Those safeguards, however, are now gone in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision upholding President Trump’s effort to fire Democratic FTC commissioners.[24] Consequently, it makes perfect sense to now apply the Tunney Act to the FTC.
Finally, we need to reconsider the HSR Act in light of the experience of the Paramount/Warner and the Nexstar/Tegna mergers: in particular to provide states with a level of assurance on merger timing if the DOJ is not operating as a trusted partner. To be sure, parties can agree to timing agreements that extend review periods to afford a sufficient opportunity for a careful review as well as enable conversations on settlements to go forward. But even if parties could use self-help, it merits consideration how to enable states to use some of the same HSR tools afforded to the federal government. Moreover, if the DOJ cannot be trusted to review mergers on the merits, Congress may well want to consider providing resources to support state AG enforcement so that we have a greater ability to pick up the slack. Consider, for example, that the DOJ antitrust division has a budget of almost $250 million, which is several times greater than all state antitrust budgets combined.[25]
Even without Congressional action, states will continue to prepare to meet the challenge of a checks and balances federalism as best we can. To that end, the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) can and does facilitate collaboration, including providing funding support for state antitrust actions. And state AGs can and do hire private counsel to help provide additional support when necessary. But there are no two ways about it: we are operating under a statutory framework not built for the realities we are facing and there is a compelling case for reform.
* * *
In closing, state attorneys general are not going to abandon our commitment to the rule of law and effective antitrust enforcement. We have the authority, the track record, the ability, and the commitment to act—whether that means pursuing our own cases, challenging federal decisions, or using the tools of transparency and public accountability to call out failings in federal antitrust enforcement. And with a bipartisan track record of stepping in when the DOJ operates under the rule of lobbyists rather than the rule of law, it is important that Congress move ahead to institute the appropriate procedural reforms just as it did in the wake of Watergate.
[1] California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990); see also Philip J. Weiser, The Enduring Promise of Antitrust, 52 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1 (2020), https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2743&context=luclj (opens new tab).
[2] See Roger P. Alford, The Rule of Law Versus the Rule of Lobbyists, TECH POLICY INSTITUTE ASPEN FORUM (Aug. 18, 2025), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20251216/118753/HHRG-119-JU05-20251216-SD009-U9.pdf (PDF) [hereinafter Alford Speech].
[3] Dana Mattioli, Dave Michaels, and Joe Palazzolo, Top DOJ Official Tells Staff He Wants to Avoid Antitrust Trials, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2026), https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/top-doj-official-tells-staff-he-wants-to-avoid-antitrust-trials-bc5a23ce (opens new tab).
[4] See DaVita Medical Group to Join Optum, DaVita (Dec. 6, 2017), https://investors.davita.com/2017-12-06-davita-medical-group-to-join-optum/.
[5] See Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser, Antitrust challenge and settlement to the UnitedHealth Group and DaVita merger will safeguard competition, cost, and quality of healthcare for seniors in the Colorado Springs Area, (June 19, 2019), https://coag.gov/press-releases/06-19-19-archived/; FTC Imposes Conditions on UnitedHealth Group’s Proposed Acquisition of DaVita Medical Group, Federal Trade Commission (June 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/06/ftc-imposes-conditions-unitedhealth-groups-proposed-acquisition-davita-medical-group (opens new tab).
[6] Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser files lawsuit to block proposed Kroger/Albertsons merger, COLO. DEP’T OF LAW (Feb. 14, 2024), https://coag.gov/2024/colorado-attorney-general-phil-weiser-files-lawsuit-to-block-proposed-kroger-albertsons-merger/.
[7] Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 3, Colorado v. Kroger Co., No. 2024CV30459 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 3, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/421700.pdf (PDF).
[8] Judge Subramanian denounced the failure to disclose the settlement and said, “It shows absolute disrespect for the court, the jury, and this entire process. It’s absolutely unacceptable.” Allie Canal, Chloe Atkins, and Ryan Reilly, Live Nation settles antitrust case with DOJ, avoids Ticketmaster breakup, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/ticketmaster-live-nation-settles-antitrust-case-rcna262392 (opens new tab).
[9] Defendants’ Description of Communications and Certification of Compliance Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 16(g), Dkt. 1534, United States, et al. v. Live Nation and Ticketmaster, 1:24-cv-03973 (Jun. 22, 2026); see also Rebecca Ballhaus, Joe Palazzolo, Dana Mattioli, Josh Dawsey, and Dave Michaels, The Trump Intervention That Got the DOJ Off Live Nation’s Back, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2026), https://www.wsj.com/business/media/trump-live-nation-antitrust-doj-f82b2c55 (opens new tab).
[10] Isabella Gomez Sarmiento, Live Nation and Justice Department reach settlement in antitrust case, NPR (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.npr.org/2026/03/09/nx-s1-5742433/live-nation-ticketmaster-doj-antitrust-case (opens new tab).
[11] Ben Sisario, David McCabe, and Olivia Bensimon, Justice Department and Live Nation Reach Settlement Terms in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/09/arts/music/live-nation-ticketmaster-antitrust-suit-settled.html (opens new tab).
[12] See Attorney General Phil Weiser sues to block $6.2B Nexstar/Tegna broadcast merger, COLO. DEP’T OF LAW (Mar. 19, 2026), https://coag.gov/press-releases/weiser-sues-to-block-nexstar-tegna-broadcast-merger/.
[13] Christopher Rugaber, Trump praises Nexstar-Tegna broadcast television deal he once opposed, AP News (Feb. 7, 2026), https://apnews.com/article/trump-nexstar-tegna-deal-037c97de84d1249c2122c8d503fda38c (opens new tab).
[14] U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Nexstar Media Group et al., No. 19-02295 (D.D.C. 2019); Statement of Commissioner Anna M. Gomez, Gomez Dissent: Transfer of Control of TEGNA to Nexstar Media (Mar. 20, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-420003A1.pdf (PDF) (explaining that the FCC “ignored the law, disregarded the public interest, and bypassed the full Commission on one of the most consequential broadcast transactions in recent memory”).
[15] In re Nexstar‑Tegna Merger Litigation, No. 2:26‑cv‑00976‑TLN‑CKD, at 6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2026).
[16] See Attorney General Phil Weiser sues to block Paramount/Warner Bros. merger, COLO. DEP’T OF LAW (Jul. 13, 2026), https://coag.gov/press-releases/weiser-sues-to-block-paramount-warner-bros-merger/.
[17] Staff of Watergate Links Milk Prices to Nixon Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 1974), http://nytimes.com/1974/06/01/archives/staff-of-watergate-links-milk-prices-to-nixon-aid-written-by.html (opens new tab); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The I.T.T. Affair and Why Public Financing Matters for Political Conventions, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/itt-affair-and-why-public-financing-matters-political-conventions (opens new tab).
[18] James M. Naughton, Alleged Memo Ties I.T.T. Trust Action To G.O.P Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/01/archives/alleged-memo-ties-itt-trust-action-to-gop-funding-alleged-memo.html (opens new tab).
[19] Tunney Act Comments of the American Antitrust Institute, 5 (Sept. 8, 2025), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/AAI-Tunney-Act-Comments-HPE-Juniper-9.8.25.pdf (PDF).
[20] Attorney General Phil Weiser urges court to reject corrupted $14B Hewlett Packard Enterprise/Juniper Networks merger settlement, COLO. DEP’T OF LAW (Mar. 16, 2026), https://coag.gov/press-releases/weiser-urges-court-to-reject-corrupted-hewlett-packard-juniper-networks-merger-settlement.
[21]Alford Speech, supra note 2; see also Dana Mattioli, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Josh Sawsey, The Threats and Bare-Knuckle Tactics of MAGA’s Top Antitrust Fixer, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2026), https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/lobbyists-antitrust-trump-davis-f6a02e04 (opens new tab).
[22] DAAG Bill Rinner Delivers Remarks to the George Washington University Competition and Innovation Lab Conference Regarding Merger Review and Enforcement, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jun. 4, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/daag-bill-rinner-delivers-remarks-george-washington-university-competition-and (opens new tab).
[23] United States of America v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co., No. 5:25‑cv‑00951‑PCP, Order Granting Motion for Entry of Final Judgment at 2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2026).
[24] See Trump v. Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. 2283 (2026); Attorney General Phil Weiser leads coalition challenging illegal firing of FTC commissioners, COLO. DEP’T OF LAW (Apr. 18, 2025), https://coag.gov/2025/attorney-general-phil-weiser-leads-coalition-challenging-illegal-firing-of-ftc-commissioners/.
[25] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division FY 2027 Performance Budget Congressional Submission (2026), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/media/1434166/dl?inline (opens new tab).