Why Somali Piracy Has Returned and May be Here to Stay

By
Matthew Reisener

July 16, 2026

Over a decade after fading from public consciousness, Somali piracy is making a comeback. Once the scourge of the maritime community, Somali mariners are responsible for at least 17 piracy-related incidents in either Somali waters or the Gulf of Aden between January-May of this year. Pirates hailing from Somalia launched their first successful attack in six years in 2023, conducted high-profile hijackings of commercial vessels in 2024 and 2025, and captured three ships between April-May of 2026 which are still being held for ransom. At least three active pirate groups are believed to be launching coordinated operations from Somalia and are increasingly targeting vessels sailing hundreds of miles into the Indian Ocean, in contrast to the previous era of Somali piracy in which attacks which were largely contained to neighboring waterways (one shipped hijacked in May was taken only 2-3 nautical miles from an oil terminal off the coast of Yemen).

The threat of Somali piracy should not be taken lightly, as recent history illustrates. After the collapse of Somalia’s government in the early 90s, local fishermen formed militias to protect coastal waters from illegal fishing and dumping, which gradually escalated to hijacking vessels. Between 2005-2012, Somali pirates claimed over $400 million in ransom payments and conducted over 1,000 attacks on foreign vessels, including 239 successful or attempted hijackings in 2011 alone. At its peak, Somali piracy cost the global economy an estimated $18 billion annually, largely by disrupting global trade through critical waterways such as the Gulf of Aden. The piracy epidemic was solved only through sustained collaboration by the international community, with entities like NATO, the EU, and the Combined Maritime Task Force launching aggressive counterpiracy operations and coordinating closely with one another, the nascent Somali government, and even geopolitical rivals such as Russia and China. These efforts were overwhelmingly successful, resulting in the incarceration of over 1,400 Somali pirates across 21 countries by early 2014 and the reduction of successful hijackings to only two between 2013-2023.

However, recent naval campaigns by the Houthis in the Red Sea and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz have had a twofold effect on the maritime environment which have allowed piracy to once again thrive in the region. Not only have the global navies that once combatted piracy off the Horn of Africa diverted their resources to counter the threats against ships in these critical waterways, but these conflicts have also drawn maritime traffic closer to Somalia’s coastline, creating openings for opportunistic pirates to target commercial ships. In particular, roughly 70% of the maritime traffic that passed through the Red Sea prior to the Houthis targeting ships in this body of water is now being rerouted through the Cape of Good Hope, not only increasing the time and costs associated with these journeys, but the risk as well in light of the pirates’’ increasingly expansive reach. Furthermore, the rising oil prices caused by the Iran War have created additional incentives for pirates to target tanker ships which they believe they can ransom for higher profits, while the rising shipping costs resulting from the war have made some ships more vulnerable due to the companies that operate them cutting corners on security to save money. Accordingly, the conflicts in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf have afforded pirates with the means and opportunity to once again operate with near impunity.

Given the strong connections between the resurgence of Somali piracy and the shipping disruptions in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, one would reasonably assume that the full resumption of maritime commerce in these bodies of water would cause piracy to fall to its pre-conflict levels. Yet while this would likely reduce the number of targets available to Somali pirates, it is unlikely to stop the attacks altogether. These naval conflicts may have enabled the renewal of piracy, but the pirates’ growing operational capabilities, Somalia’s diminished capacity to respond to them, and the underlying economic conditions which are driving many Somalis to piracy may keep the threat alive well after shipping returns to normal in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.

Somali pirates are operating with a significantly higher level of sophistication previously seen. Fifteen years ago, pirates typically approached vessels using one or two skiffs launched either from shore or from a nearby mothership and attempted to board them and take them hostage using small arms. Now, pirates are using GPS and satellites to track commercial vessels far from the Somali coastline and using more sophisticated motherships to operate farther offshore. While many previous pirate attack groups had “fewer firearms than men,” contemporary Somali pirates appear better and more heavily armed due to their partnerships with regional militant groups such as the Houthis and al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgency that controls territory in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab has offered protection and logistical support to pirates in exchange for a share of their plunder, in addition to connecting the pirates with the Houthis who agreed to arm and train them in hopes of further disrupting regional maritime commerce. In at least two instances, pirates are believed to have coordinated directly with Houthi officials to plan attacks on commercial vessels. This level of external support for piracy could enable attacks to continue even if maritime traffic and patrols return to their pre-conflict levels. Even if the Houthis ceased their cooperation with the pirates, the arms, hardware, and tactics these groups acquired from this partnership would make them an enduring threat.

Additionally, instability in Somalia has historically correlated to a spike in piracy, and the country’s current internal struggles could help prolong the problem even after shipping normalizes in the region. Somalia’s government is enmeshed in an ongoing constitutional crisis which has seen federal elections postponed, two semi-autonomous governments withdraw their recognition of Somalia’s federal authority, and an attempt by the central government to remove the leader of Somalia’s Jubaland state from power. Meanwhile, the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has historically played a key role in combatting piracy, is currently overstretched due to its ongoing fights against both al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. While the bilateral Somali-Turkish agreement to equip and train Somalia’s navy could help increase its counter-piracy capabilities, these efforts are in their infancy, and Somalia presently struggles to stop pirates that are now capable of operating as far as 1,000 kilometers from shore. It is no coincidence that the previous decline in Somali piracy largely aligns with the foundation of Somalia’s current federal government in 2012, which allowed for greater coordination between Somalia and international naval forces. The internal factors undermining Somalia’s governance and law enforcement capacities could complicate similar collaborations, even if international counterpiracy efforts resume in earnest.

Finally, the economic drivers that have compelled Somalis to seize this window of opportunity and return to piracy could prolong the crisis once shipping returns to normal in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, an original drivers of Somali piracy, is now costing Somalia an average of $300 million annually, and foreign vessels have become increasingly aggressive in crowding out local fishermen. This economic desperation has been compounded by cuts to US development programs targeting Somali coastal communities, which eliminated some of the economic opportunities that once served as viable alternatives to piracy. While the US provided $476 million in aid to Somalia in 2024, that number was reduced to $70 million in 2025, and only $3 million was sent to the country in the first three months of 2026. Given that Somalia has some of the world’s highest global poverty and fewest economic opportunities, it is little wonder many are attracted to piracy and the promise of riches, particularly since ships ransomed in the past few years have netted profits as high as $5 million.

While the resurgence in Somali piracy is inextricably linked to the maritime disruptions in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, it would be naïve to expect this trend to disappear once shipping traffic returns to normal. Driven by increasingly dire local conditions and buoyed by newfound international support, Somali pirates will have every incentive to continue their operations even if pre-conflict conditions return. To combat this threat, the international community must not only resume the maritime cooperation that once defeated piracy off the Horn of Africa but also address the underlying sociopolitical causes driving this phenomenon. Absent such actions, Somali piracy may once again emerge as one of the leading threats to maritime commerce.

Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.