Integration process in Iraq: Is a new October 9 Agreement being prepared?
Recent developments in the Middle East cannot be viewed independently of either the Iran–Israel/United States conflict or the Peace and Democratic Society Process carried out in Turkey under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. The political, security, and economic steps taken by countries across the region in recent months have all had a direct impact on one another.
The large-scale anti-corruption operation in Iraq, the ongoing process of integrating armed groups into the Iraqi army, and the Development Road Project should not be viewed merely as elements of Iraq’s internal restructuring.
The integration process in Iraq
A historic transformation is unfolding in Iraq around the new government’s political agenda. Pressure to restructure the country’s armed groups and integrate them into state institutions has become one of the most significant issues on the national agenda. Some of these armed factions are also represented in parliament, indicating that the integration process will be shaped not only by military considerations but also through political negotiations.
Several ministerial positions in the current government remain unfilled, including key posts such as the Ministry of Interior. Against this backdrop, the renewed debate over integrating armed organizations into Iraq’s state security institutions represents more than a security sector reform—it is evolving into a process that could fundamentally reshape the country’s political balance.
Following Iraq’s most recent elections, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi initiated the integration process with the approval of Iraq’s leading Shiite religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and the support of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Coordination Framework, the main Shiite political alliance.
To oversee the process, the government established the Commission for the Collection of Weapons and the Severance of Armed Affiliations under State Control. The commission is expected to first compile a comprehensive inventory of existing armed groups, including personnel records, salary structures, and chains of command. It will then determine whether units should be incorporated into the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior.
The integration program is designed to proceed in stages. Administrative and financial oversight will be established first, followed by technical measures such as military training, rank harmonization, and the unification of command structures.
As part of the process, several armed groups have already held ceremonies marking the surrender of their weapons. On 4 June, in a ceremony attended by Iraqi military officials at Saraya al-Salam’s base in Samarra, the group formally announced its dissolution.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq, one of the most influential armed factions operating within Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) and also represented in parliament through the Sadiqun Movement, relinquished its armed wing while seeking to preserve its political influence.
Meanwhile, the Imam Ali Brigades announced on 2 June that they had ended their affiliation with the Popular Mobilization Forces. As of 10 June, the group had submitted its weapons inventory and personnel records to the commission established by the al-Zaidi government.
On the other hand, several factions—including Kataib Hezbollah, the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, the Harakat al-Nujaba, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, Ashab al-Kahf, and the Karbala Brigades—have publicly rejected the initiative, stating that they oppose the integration program and refusing even to consider surrendering their weapons.
The YJŞ–YBŞ factor as the defense force of the region and the Yazidi community
The second major pillar of the integration program concerns the possible inclusion of the YJŞ–YBŞ, the defense forces of Shengal and the Yazidi community, in the broader integration process.
Speaking at the Nineveh Dialogue Symposium, Hashd al-Shaabi Chairman Falih al-Fayyad stated that within three months, all of Shengal—particularly Mount Shengal—would come under the control of Iraqi security forces. His remarks immediately prompted debate over whether the YJŞ–YBŞ, organized as the Yazidis’ self-defense force, would be officially recognized and integrated into the Iraqi army, or whether a new arrangement similar to the October 9 Agreement would instead be imposed.
No contact has been established with the Shengal Democratic Autonomous Administration, which represents the political will of the Yazidi community, nor with its defense forces, YBŞ–YJŞ, regarding any integration process. This has inevitably raised the question of whether another agreement—similar to the October 9 Agreement and one that disregards the political will of the Yazidis—is once again being prepared.
The answer remains unclear. However, Falih al-Fayyad’s emphasis on a “three-month” timeframe coincides closely with the scheduled withdrawal of the Global Coalition against ISIS from Iraq.
The capture of Mosul by ISIS in 2014 and the subsequent atrocities committed in Shengal exposed fundamental structural weaknesses within Iraq’s security system. In the aftermath of those attacks, the YJŞ–YBŞ emerged as an active local defense force and, since 2014, has continued to protect Shengal against ISIS and other security threats as a force established by the local population itself.
The recent increase in ISIS activity across the region has further heightened security concerns.
Alongside the challenges of reconstruction, the safe return of displaced residents, and the lack of basic public services, the continuing threat posed by ISIS remains a matter of critical importance—not only for the people of Shengal but also for neighboring countries. The possibility of excluding the YJŞ–YBŞ, which the Yazidi community organized against ISIS to prevent another genocide, from the region’s future security structure and replacing it with an externally imposed force has become a major source of concern.
The mandate of the Global Coalition against ISIS is set to expire in September, making the existence of a capable local defense force even more crucial. Unless local security forces are formally recognized and integrated into the Iraqi army through a credible and inclusive framework that prevents a security vacuum, the region could face serious instability in the period ahead.
The development road project and Turkey’s security justification
At the same time that the Hashd al-Shaabi Chairman made the remarks that fueled the mentioned debate, a high-profile Turkish delegation paid a notable visit to Iraq. Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Chief İbrahim Kalın carried out a two-day tour covering Baghdad, Kirkuk, Hewlêr (Erbil), and Sulaymaniyah. Officially presented as focusing on trade corridors, energy geopolitics, and coordination surrounding the ongoing “process,” the visit also intensified discussions over how Iraq’s Development Road Project could reshape the country’s future security architecture.
The Development Road Project, which has the potential to transform the geopolitical position of Iraq and neighboring countries, is envisioned as a transportation and logistics corridor stretching from the Persian Gulf to European markets via Turkey. Now entering its implementation phase, the project is viewed by Turkey as an area of strategic military influence as well. Its planned route also passes through the Mosul–Nineveh–Shengal corridor, a region that has experienced years of instability due to ISIS attacks.
Public concern has grown over claims that Turkey is expanding its presence in Iraq under the justification of securing the project. Critics argue that the project is being used to facilitate the military encirclement of Shengal, regarded as one of its strategic locations, to pave the way for dismantling the region’s local defense force, YJŞ–YBŞ, and to further Turkey’s efforts to force the Kurdish freedom movement into a corner.
It would seem that measures presented as necessary for “security” effectively disregard the will of the people of Shengal. By weakening the Shengal Democratic Autonomous Administration, the Development Road Project is seen by critics as a means through which Turkey seeks to expand its military and political influence across the region.
The process is also affecting countries across the region
The concerns expressed by the public are not based solely on the fact that Kalın’s visit was presented as being related to the Development Road Project. At the same time, Ankara has yet to take the steps expected of it within the framework of the Peace and Democratic Society Process being carried out under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. Even the draft framework law has not been shared with the relevant parties, and the İmralı Delegation has been prevented from meeting with Öcalan for more than forty days. While Öcalan and the Kurdish Freedom Movement are described as having fulfilled their responsibilities in the process, critics argue that the Turkish state has not acted in accordance with the requirements of the initiative. Instead, they point to what they describe as unusual contacts, such as the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization meeting with politicians from neighboring countries to discuss “economic projects.”
Following Kalın’s meetings, the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) issued a statement warning of risks surrounding the process and alleging that preparations for a new war were underway. The statement said:
“Under the current circumstances, policies are being pursued as if preparations are being made for a new war. İbrahim Kalın visited Iraq not only as the head of an intelligence organization but also as though he were the prime minister of a government. Similar meetings had taken place before the attacks on Rojava. What is the role of the Deputy Secretary General of MIT in Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, and Hewlêr? Is it intended that these forces be assigned a role in a plan to eliminate and attack our Freedom Movement?”
The statement also claimed that similar discussions were being held with Iran and pointed out that the Iraqi government should not become part of such a plan.
With the Peace and Democratic Society Process, security policies, security agreements, and economic initiatives across the Iraq–Syria–Turkey corridor are increasingly influencing one another. The succession of statements, diplomatic visits, and policy shifts occurring during the same period is viewed by many observers as more than a coincidence. Their direct impact on the Kurds is likely to become clearer in the coming days.