Turkey’s bid to dump its S-400s and regain the F-35 puts Algeria, Egypt and other African military powers in the spotlight

The Kremlin has confirmed that Moscow is discussing the future of Turkey’s Russian-made S-400 air-defence systems after Turkish media reported that Ankara could transfer them to an unnamed Gulf country.

“This is an extremely sensitive issue,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, adding that Russia would continue its contacts with the Turkish government.

Further reports have identified the United Arab Emirates as a possible destination, although neither Ankara nor Abu Dhabi has confirmed negotiations.

For now, the Gulf remains a more plausible destination than Africa because no government on the continent has been publicly linked to the talks.

India has also featured in speculation surrounding the systems, but that possibility appears weak.

A separate defence assessment said New Delhi was unlikely to show interest because Turkey received a more limited export configuration than India, which has already signed a $5.5 billion deal for five S-400 units and discussed further deliveries with Russia.

Even so, the dispute has wider implications for Africa, where governments increasingly spread military purchases across Russia, China, the United States, Europe, Israel and Turkey.

Algeria offers the clearest evidence of Russia’s longstanding defence influence in Africa.

Russia supplied 48 per cent of Algeria’s major arms imports between 2020 and 2024, down from about 73 per cent between 2018 and 2022, while the country spent $25.4 billion on its military in 2025, making it Africa’s largest defence spender.

Algeria’s defence ties with Russia also extend to its air-defence network, which includes S-300PMU-2, Buk-M2E, Tor-M2E and Pantsir-S1 systems.

During the Al-Sumoud 2025 live-fire exercise, reports said the Algerian military publicly displayed an operational S-400 system for the first time.

Its state media also reported in February 2025 that the country had bought Russia’s Su-57E fifth-generation stealth fighters and that its pilots were training in Russia.

The reported purchase strengthens Algeria’s place in the wider debate because of its large military budget and reliance on Russian equipment, although there is no evidence that Algiers has discussed acquiring Turkey’s S-400 systems.

Angola has also featured in past African discussions about possible interest in the S-400 system.

In 2019, then-defence minister Salviano de Jesus Sequeira said Luanda was interested in the system but had not opened talks because of financial constraints. He noted that Angola’s armed forces were accustomed to Russian equipment.

Angola operates Russian-made Su-30K fighter jets and air-defence systems such as the 2K12 Kub and S-125.

However, the statement dates back several years and provides no evidence of current interest in the S-400.

Egypt presents a more complicated case because Cairo has built one of Africa’s most diversified military procurement networks.

SIPRI ranked Egypt as the world’s 12th-largest arms importer between 2021 and 2025, with France, Germany and Italy supplying most of its major weapons.

However, Cairo still operates Russian-made MiG-29M/M2 fighter jets and Ka-52 attack helicopters, alongside an air-defence network that includes S-300VM, Buk-M2E, Tor, Pantsir, Pechora-2M, Kub and upgraded S-125 systems.

Like Turkey, the North African military power faced US sanctions pressure after reportedly signing a $2 billion deal for more than 20 Russian Su-35 fighters in 2019, which never entered Egyptian service.

Despite the earlier dispute, the United States approved a possible $4.67 billion sale of NASAMS equipment to Egypt in July 2025.

This shift has reduced Egypt’s reliance on Moscow, while its defence ties with Washington, Europe and Israel could complicate another major Russian arms deal.

Morocco, by contrast, has moved deeper into the US and Israeli defence orbit.

The kingdom overtook Algeria as Africa’s largest recipient of major arms between 2021 and 2025 after its imports rose by 12 per cent, according to SIPRI.

The United States supplied 60 per cent of Morocco’s imported major arms during the period, followed by Israel with 24 per cent and France with 10 per cent.

Rabat is therefore a weaker fit for the S-400 narrative than Algeria, Egypt or Angola.

Ethiopia offers a contemporary geopolitical angle rather than a documented S-400 connection, although it already operates Russian-made air-defence equipment.

Its military uses several Russian and Soviet-designed weapons, including Su-27 fighter jets, Mi-24/Mi-35 attack helicopters, T-55 and T-72 tanks, and Pantsir-S1 air-defence systems.

Addis Ababa and Moscow have expanded military and technical cooperation through agreements covering training, skills and defence technology, but despite the latest developments, Ethiopia has not publicly expressed interest in Turkey’s S-400 systems.

Turkey’s experience shows how defence ties with one major power can complicate relations with another.

Ankara bought the S-400 in 2019 despite US warnings that the Russian system could compromise sensitive F-35 technology.

Washington subsequently removed Ankara from the F-35 procurement and manufacturing programme and sanctioned Turkey’s Presidency of Defence Industries in 2020 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.

Turkey paid a substantial industrial price, as its companies produced more than 900 F-35 components and stood to earn over $9 billion from the programme, according to the US Department of Defense.

More recently, US President Donald Trump reopened the possibility of lifting the sanctions and reconsidering an F-35 sale.

“We’re going to be taking the sanctions off. It’s time. We don’t want to sanction friends,” Trump told reporters before meeting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

He also said his administration would consider an F-35 sale, although Turkey would first need to surrender control of the Russian systems and overcome resistance from US lawmakers.

For African governments, Turkey’s dispute shows how defence purchases can place countries between competing powers such as Russia, the United States and China.

Algeria’s close military ties with Moscow, Egypt’s multi-supplier diplomacy and Morocco’s alignment with Washington illustrate the different paths available, but each carries trade-offs involving sanctions, technology access and wider strategic relations.