The Battle for Tigray – Ethiopia Insight

Why TPLF’s reckless gamble may actually pay off

After months of political setbacks, internal fractures, and the loss of its grip on Tigray’s administration, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) seems to have staged a remarkable comeback.

Its resurgence, however, puts it on a collision course with the federal government, raising fears of a return to the devastating war that Pretoria’s peace agreement was meant to end. But for Tigray’s embattled leadership, this renewed leverage could also mean a second chance to negotiate more favorable terms within Pretoria’s framework.

When the full details of the Pretoria Agreement emerged, the shock was immediate. Even within the TPLF’s own ranks—and among the broader Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)—there was bewilderment. Questions piled up. No one seemed to have clear answers. I recall watching Ambassador Fiseha Asgedom, who represented Tigrayan interests to the international community, visibly shaken, struggle through a barrage of inquiries from Tigrayan diaspora, admitting that he too had been left in the dark. His only reassurance: Whatever the TPLF delegation had signed, they must have had a reason.

That reason, however, was difficult to swallow. The dismantling of Tigray’s government, the humiliating concession that the hard-fought regional election of 2020 had been illegal, the acceptance of a federal military presence in Tigray, and the agreement to demobilize the TDF within a matter of weeks. It was clear that this was not just a peace deal. It was a surrender.

Military Setbacks

Tigrayans understood that their forces had suffered major battlefield losses. But no one expected outright capitulation. And as it turned out, neither did the TPLF leadership back in Tigray.

In the final stretch of the Tigray war, the Ethio-Eritrean military command had reportedly deployed an ingenious yet ruthless strategy: Limiting each Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and allied soldier to just 60 bullets while positioning ammunition dumps as far as 40 kilometers from the front lines. The plan was simple but devastatingly effective. Tigrayan forces, already under siege and heavily reliant on captured enemy ammunition, found themselves starved of ammunition. As Ethiopian forces advanced in overwhelming numbers, Tigrayan defensive lines crumbled, forcing a rapid retreat deep into central Tigray.

Faced with imminent military collapse, the Tigray Central Command reached a stark resolution: If the delegation negotiating in Pretoria failed to secure a ceasefire, Mekelle would be abandoned. The TDF would melt into the mountains and revert to insurgency—a return to the guerrilla tactics that had twice propelled the TPLF to power.

So when news broke that an agreement had been signed, relief swept through Tigray. But that relief was short-lived. The actual terms of the Pretoria Agreement sparked confusion and resentment. The Tigrayan delegation had been sent to negotiate a ceasefire—nothing more. Yet, in signing a deal that effectively nullified Tigray’s political prerogatives, the delegation had far exceeded its mandate.

How the region’s negotiators came to accept such humiliating terms in Pretoria remains a matter of much speculation. Getachew Reda later disclosed that the Ethiopian side applied relentless psychological pressure, feeding the delegates a steady stream of reports about the Ethiopian advances to within a range of Mekelle. Meanwhile, the TDF command—locked in a bitter fight for survival—provided little information to counter the narrative.

Forced Concessions

Despite the grim rumors of battlefield setbacks, TDF forces had not yet collapsed. In fact, on the very day the agreement was to be signed, fierce resistance around Adwa had forced the federal military to reconsider the feasibility of a second swift capture of Mekelle. Mounting ENDF losses compelled the Ethiopian side to consider a slightly improved offer—one that, at the very least, left the fate of Western Tigray subject to constitutional resolution. For the Tigrayan delegation bombarded with demoralizing reports, Pretoria must have felt like a victory.[1]

Nevertheless, one of the most humbling aspects of the agreement—the decision to recognize the dismantling of Tigray’s government and nullify the region’s 2020 regional election—cannot simply be explained by the delegates’ psychological vulnerability. As Assefa Abraha, a member of the Tigrayan delegation and the brother of former TPLF commander Siye Abraha, later revealed, the Ethiopian delegation had already signaled its willingness to recognize the regional parliament, limiting administrative changes to cabinet reshuffles.

The TPLF leadership back in Tigray later came to conclude it had been betrayed in Pretoria. The abrupt shift from the harsh terms of the agreement to the more generous Nairobi Declaration can better be understood if we consider a critical factor: Brokered by the US envoy, an implicit understanding had been reached between key members of the Tigrayan delegation and the federal representatives to eliminate the TPLF itself.

In Nairobi, the swift disarmament of TDF was quietly shelved. Instead, the handing over of heavy weapons was now to occur “concurrently with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces”—a subtle but decisive shift implying that both the federal government and the Tigrayan delegation (now also including TDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede) saw value in not rushing to dismantle TDF.[2] This alone was enough to set off alarm bells in Asmara. Eritrea has long since viewed the Nairobi Declaration as the first manifestation of Ethiopia’s betrayal

Unspoken Deal

In retrospect, the TPLF leadership came to believe that an unspoken deal had been struck—one that served the interests of both the federal government and certain members of the Tigrayan delegation. The arrangement, as they saw it, was this: oversee the gradual dismantling of the TPLF from within, consolidate control over the TDF, and then, when the time was ripe, redirect those forces against Eritrea. This, it seems, was particularly enticing proposition for two key Tigrayan negotiators: Tsadkan Gebretensae and Getachew Reda.

Neither had deep loyalty to the TPLF. Tsadkan, once purged from his position as ENDF Chief of Staff by Meles Zenawi, had every reason to bear a grudge. For him, the TPLF’s demise wasn’t a loss—it was an opportunity. With the party sidelined and a tacit nod from Addis, he could finally pursue the glory that had eluded him for two decades: eliminating Isaias Afwerki and bring regime change in Eritrea—or at least annex Assab—thereby securing his place in history as the second coming of Alula Aba Nega, the famous Tigrayan war hero.

Getachew, a fast-rising party insider who had leapfrogged the ranks due to his rhetorical skills rather than long-time party loyalty, had little reason to mourn TPLF’s demise. For them, saving Tigray while eliminating the TPLF was very acceptable. As Fiseha Habtsion, TPLF senior figure and member of the Tigrayan delegation, later disclosed, much of the Nairobi negotiations were carried out in secret by Getachew and Tsadkan, while the rest of the Tigrayan delegation remained in the dark—a fact conceded by Tsadkan. In effect, rather ironically, the ‘real’ TPLF wasn’t represented in the negotiations.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two men later found themselves at the helm of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA), with only Lt. Gen. Tadesse—a vice-president alongside Tsadkan—as a counterweight.

Outwitted Again

TPLF HQ decided to take Pretoria’s bitter concessions on the chin. It carried out an extensive series of meetings and after deliberations, announced that it will accept the Pretoria Agreement, aiming to exploit its loose terms.

In subsequent dialogues, the TPLF leadership walked straight into the trap when, in the spirit of trust, it agreed to expedite the establishment of the TIRA even before its terrorist designation was removed by the federal government. According to Fetlework Gebregziabher (aka ‘Monjorno’), a high-ranking TPLF leader, the party consented after accepting the federal government’s explanation that such a gesture would ease hostile public scrutiny when the terrorist designation got lifted by parliament.

However, the real plan, the TPLF leadership soon began to suspect, was to neutralize the party by keeping it legally crippled. The federal government delayed its removal from the terrorism list for an extended period—and has yet to fully restore its legal status—giving TIRA ample time to establish itself in Tigray and supplant TPLF’s power structures.

When the TPLF leadership, after Abiy rejected its initial proposal of Debretsion in favor of a “junior leader” outside the Executive Committee, instead put forward Getachew, an Executive Committee member, it was an early Christmas gift for Addis. Federal authorities had been angling for a weak, inexperienced figure who would offer little resistance. Instead, they got Getachew, who, as it turned out, may have been their ideal candidate all along.

Changing Times

Fetlework later claimed that the TPLF leadership grew confused and suspicious upon learning that the Prosperity Party had unanimously approved Getachew despite the fact that he did not meet their criteria.

Getachew’s public statements did little to ease the TPLF’s growing suspicions. He repeatedly challenged the ambiguity surrounding the party’s cherished “Mesmer” [principle], questioning whether anyone within the organization even understood what it meant. He claimed the TPLF must “introspect if it has ideas that are incompatible with the times and need to be corrected.”

His call for the party to move with the times didn’t sit well with TPLF hardliners, who are deeply committed to the ideals of resistance and Tigrayan patriotism. “The TPLF is a progressive party,” he had said. “The times are changing; there’s a chance we could be seen as either a friend or an enemy [by external powers]. The party should adapt to the changing world—without abandoning its core principles or its loyalty to the people.”

Such remarks raised eyebrows within the party and beyond. Yet, the TPLF leadership proved too slow to recognize the warning signs—or too passive to confront them.

Debretsion Gebremichael, indecisive by nature, found himself trailing behind events, unwittingly walking into the trap set for his party. He passively accepted the federal resolution that granted the TIRA president near-absolute power[3]—a move that would prove disastrous for the TPLF’s grip on Tigray.

Resisting Chokehold

Eyebrows were raised when, under the guise of separating party from government, TIRA began systematically starving the TPLF of funding. Dependent on government resources for party operations, the TPLF found itself in financial distress as the TIRA’s reforms sent alarm bells ringing through its ranks.

Initial attempts by the party to counteract this—leveraging its dominance over lower administrative structures (woredas and kebeles) to slow TIRA’s consolidation—were met with swift and decisive action. Getachew, now firmly in control, moved to purge key TPLF officials from their administrative posts including Alem Gebrewahid and Amanuel Assefa.

Now the gloves were off.

Both factions, acutely aware of their precariousness, embarked on a relentless scramble for legitimacy. Each launched sweeping public outreach efforts—regionwide tours, town hall meetings, and displays of mass support. Against the backdrop of a war-ravaged region, the sheer competitiveness of the political rivalry was striking.

The neutrality of the security forces created an atmosphere of genuine contestation—an experience virtually unprecedented in Tigray, where even the 2005 elections, hailed as a high point of Ethiopia’s democratic aspirations, had unfolded under the TPLF’s iron grip.

Divergent Strategies

Getachew and Tsadkan’s camp set out to build a broad-based coalition, courting opposition parties, civil society groups, academics, and religious institutions. Their goal was apparently to gain momentum that would end in establishment of an Advisory Council, dominated by anti-TPLF stakeholders —that would both legitimize TIRA in the absence of an elected regional parliament and erode the TPLF’s authority.

Their efforts proved remarkably successful.

Debretsion’s faction, meanwhile, turned to the rural heartlands, hoping to mobilize support from the ground up. The plan was simple but time-tested: Consolidate control over local party offices and community associations, gain grassroots momentum, and, ultimately, leverage the party congress to purge Getachew and his loyalists. The strategy mirrored Meles’s maneuver during TPLF’s internal power struggle in 2001—a battle fought and won through procedural means.

The contrast between the two camps was stark, revealing deeper ideological rifts. Debretsion’s TPLF leaned into its Marxist-Leninist roots, placing its faith in its cadre network and the loyalty of the rural masses while largely disregarding urban and educated demographics—reflecting its deep, ideologically driven mistrust of the middle class.  

Getachew’s faction, by contrast, mirrored the Prosperity Party’s (PP) strategy that had dismantled the EPRDF and forced the TPLF into retreat in 2018: An elite-driven, populist, urban-centric campaign that skillfully leveraged media, digital platforms, and youth mobilization. From plans to reshape the party from within to adopting strikingly similar rhetoric—branding supporters as “change agents” and opponents as “backward”—to deploying “academic conferences” as political ammunition, it was a near reenactment of PP’s playbook. To critics, this was no coincidence. They argued that Getachew and Tsadkan’s ultimate goal was not just to reform the Tigray’s politics, but to steer it toward political realignment with PP.

Tigray Defiant

But Tigray was not Ethiopia, and the TPLF was not the EPRDF. The strategy had some successes. For example, just as Abiy’s camp had turned the party structures of Amhara and Oromia against their former TPLF patrons, so too did Getachew’s faction cultivate a base in southern Tigray, particularly Raya, his homeland, by tapping into longstanding grievances of marginalization. Moreover, much like Abiy, Getachew’s advocacy appealed to and heavily relied on the support of the urban intelligentsia, particularly in Mekelle, in his efforts to undermine the establishment. Yet, beyond this limited terrain, the battle proved far tougher.

Unlike in Amhara and Oromia, where resentment against TPLF rule had been deeply entrenched, in much of Tigray, the party was not merely an institution—it was “wudibey”; ‘my organization’; an entity woven into the fabric of rural identity and an epitome of organized resistance. Moreover, apart from Raya and the Southeast, Debretsion’s TPLF retained the party’s tested cadre network that proved key to mobilizing the masses. And deprived of the broader rural masses, Getachew’s base remained confined to elites and urban youth.  

Debretsion’s leadership set its sights on eliminating internal opposition and securing the party apparatus through the TPLF’s 14th General Congress. Their strategy was clear—whoever controlled the TPLF, the sole influential political force in Tigray, would dictate the region’s future. In Tigray, the party’s folk name, ‘Wudib’ (literally ‘organization’), underscored its unmatched political dominance.

Debretsion’s camp understood that legitimacy in Tigray depended on winning over the cadres and the rural masses as the rightful TPLF—not on Addis Ababa’s acknowledgement (for safety they nonetheless quietly signed the re-registration of the party while publicly condemning it). They succeeded, despite a fierce, albeit delayed, challenge from Getachew’s side.

Apart from South Tigray, Getachew’s faction failed to secure support from party cadres, with the overwhelming majority of lower-level members aligning with Debretsion. Even with 14 Central Committee members and the Central Control Commission defecting, Debretsion’s side managed to consolidate control—mirroring Meles’s maneuver two decades earlier, when he retained party control despite dissent from half of the executive members.

Army Loyalty

The rest was inevitable. Despite the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) maneuvering to deny legitimacy to the TPLF’s controversial 14th Congress—eventually leading to the party’s suspension—Debretsion’s leadership had one crucial objective: Securing the loyalty of the TDF commanders. Once the congress was concluded, their success in doing so was all but assured.

The TDF, after all, had pledged allegiance to the party even in the midst of war, despite fierce opposition from rival factions that had pushed for a politically neutral military. For the commanders, TPLF was not just a political entity but the very lifeblood of Tigray’s resistance—a vanguard force whose survival was inextricably tied to the region’s fate. Getachew’s faction lobbied hard behind the scenes, but in the end, they secured only a handful of defections. The overwhelming majority stood by Debretsion.

What followed was predictable. Backed by TDF, TPLF leveraged its military influence to reclaim its dominance. A swift series of army-backed maneuvers saw TPLF loyalists regain control of key administrative offices in TIRA strongholds, town by town, finally including Mekelle’s administration, forcing Getachew and his supporters to retreat to Addis Ababa.

For Getachew, his departure marked not just a tactical withdrawal but a political implosion. His subsequent press conference in Addis—delivered to Ethiopian media outlets that had, until recently, vilified Tigrayans with unchecked vitriol—was widely seen as a desperate plea for federal military intervention. For a people still reeling from the ENDF’s war crimes, such an appeal was nothing short of treasonous.

In doing so, he may as well have signed his own political death warrant. Once revered as a hero of the resistance, his reckless rhetoric and apparent willingness to defend the very government that had waged war on Tigray obliterated any distinction between him and past appointed leaders like Mulu Nega and Abraham Belay, whose subservience to Abiy was total.

As for Tsadkan, it seems he saw the writing on the wall. Having perceived the battle as lost, he left the country.

‘Treason’ Vindicated?

Was Tsadkan’s—and Getachew’s—radical position driven by vengeance and betrayal? Were they ‘bandas’ – traitors to the TPLF and the Tigray people? To the former, perhaps. But, I hold, not necessarily to the latter. “What should be clear is that my efforts are not a protest against the past… ‘I am not against something, I am for something,” Tsadkan had said when asked whether his motives stemmed from resentment toward TPLF.

Tsadkan and Getachew can be perceived as a pragmatic faction within the Tigrayan resistance—one that acknowledged Tigray’s total defeat in the war and, like all realists, sought to chart a new course for its people. Their vision was bold and unapologetic: TPLF, along with the resistance narrative that had defined Tigray for the past half-century, had to be abandoned. This would mean painful concessions, such as accepting the loss of Western Tigray and recognizing that Ethiopia’s ethnic federalist system had reached its limits.

But was this such a bad thing? If the devastating war made sure that Tigray’s independence—or even a confederal arrangement within Ethiopia—was no longer viable, what purpose would Western Tigray serve beyond fueling an endless cycle of conflict with the Amhara, a trap the Oromo Prosperity bloc seeks to manipulate northerners by keeping them locked in perpetual hostility with each other? Even in the unlikely event that Tigray reclaimed the disputed territories, the political reality under PP’s demographic-based representation system would ensure it remained a marginalized minority, encircled by hostile neighbors in Amhara and Eritrea.

Instead, Tsadkan and Getachew’s camp, it appears, embraced the inevitability and desirability of Ethiopia’s radical reconfiguration—allegedly Abiy’s best-kept secret—set to unfold via the anticipated revision of the country’s constitution. Their vision for Tigray may have extended beyond reclaiming lost territories; it was tied to Ethiopia’s broader restructuring—annexing (or at the very least introducing regime change in) Eritrea and dismantling the ethno-federal order by atomizing larger regions into smaller geographic states, effectively neutralizing both Amhara and Eritrea as existential threats.

For Tsadkan et al., if this meant burying TPLF’s legacy and rewriting Tigray’s political identity, the end justified the means. For them, perhaps, the Tigray people’s survival hinged not on nostalgia for past glories but on securing a future within a transformed Ethiopian state—even if it entailed the ceasing to exist of the Tigray heartland in its present form and shape. For obvious reasons, they couldn’t disclose this to the Tigrayan public, instead opting for a smokescreen of ambiguity and doublespeak, carefully preparing the ground for an inevitable reckoning.

Retracing Mengesha

In some ways, Getachew and Tsadkan’s camp represented an opportunity for reconciliation between Addis Ababa and Mekelle. They appeared to believe that Tigray’s best chance at securing influence in a post-war Ethiopia was through political alignment with PP. For the TPLF, this was anathema. Not only because it would undo Ethiopia’s ethno-federal constitution and erode Tigray’s hard-fought regional autonomy but also because alignment with PP, an elite-driven party, was a direct betrayal of TPLF’s historical commitment to the toiling masses.

To not so few Tigrayans, Getachew and Tsadkan’s approach echoed Mengesha Yohannes’ decision to submit to Menelik II after the death of his father, Emperor Yohannes IV. But this time, it would, in effect, finalize Tigray’s integration into Ethiopia’s political center—a process left incomplete during the imperial era—and strip the region of its historical role as the fortress of the periphery.

One might even wonder, looking at the rise of Brigade N’hamedu and the growing pan-Tigrayan narrative, whether a joint military action on Asmara could have paved the way for the reintegration of Trans-Mereb Tigrayans—separated after the Battle of Adwa—thereby addressing a century-long fault line in East African geopolitics.

Strategic Stalemate

Does the defeat of pro-Addis elements in Tigray spell war, as some analysts would want us to believe? On the contrary, with the TPLF firmly back in control of the region and the TDF beyond Abiy’s reach—coupled with a hostile Asmara next door—Addis is more likely to lower its battle drums, shelving any lingering ambitions of securing access to the Red Sea.

The return of TPLF dominance in Tigray may have locked Addis and Mekelle into a strategic stalemate, at least in the short-term. Abiy lacks both the resources and the political will to launch another military campaign, while the TPLF recognizes that any alliances it forges—whether with Eritrea or Amhara’s Fano militia—are purely tactical and inherently unstable. Neither side is in a position to wage another war, nor can they afford to.

Ironically, as opposed to portrayals of the TDF as a destabilizing force, it appears, it is in fact TDF’s presence and neutrality which is preventing relapse into another round of war in the Horn.

Attempts to weaken the TPLF by supporting opposition elements in Tigray could also backfire on Addis. The last thing the federal government wants is a civil war in Tigray that could unravel the region’s chain of command, potentially allowing certain factions within the army and party to align with Eritrea.

Revitalized Containment

The government’s struggles in Amhara have already shown that the proliferation of multiple militant groups—rather than a single unified adversary—invites external interference, destabilizing the region and undermining prospects for a negotiated settlement. A similar fragmentation in Tigray would effectively mean the federal government loses any semblance of control over the entire northern Ethiopia as it descends into a no-man’s land.

The downside is that, with no possibility of political or strategic alignment between PP and TPLF, the federal government could adopt a policy of containment, further derailing Tigray’s reintegration into federal structures. Reports of the federal government cutting off fuel supplies to Tigray are early indications that the federal-TPLF standoff could lead to a relapse into such tactics.

Regardless, after toying with the idea of promoting email-based public nominations for the TIRA presidency—presumably to save face in light of its political setback following Getachew’s removal—the federal government has now reluctantly accepted the TPLF’s nomination of Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede. 

Since Tadesse is the TDF’s commander-in-chief, not a party official, his rise to power could potentially spark a power struggle between the TPLF and the TDF—likely one of the reasons why the federal government has opted to acquiesce to his appointment. Nevertheless, this move signals an implicit concession by Addis to the TPLF’s gains and a willingness—at least for now—to compromise.

Gamble Justified?

The TPLF’s resurgence puts the federal government’s long-term centralized nation-building project on the back foot, signaling a resurgence of federalist forces in Ethiopia’s politics.

The nationalist wing of PP, which has pushed for the gradual erosion of Ethiopia’s ethno-federal system, now faces a significant obstacle. This may force the federal government to abandon its pan-nationalist overtures and retreat into self-preservation mode—entrenching itself in Oromo nationalism, as suggested by the calls for an inclusive transitional government in Oromia in the recent federal-brokered OLF-OFC conference.

Alternatively, it could lead to new power-sharing deals with groups like the OLF and Fano, granting them greater regional influence in a bid to maintain its hold on the center by playing them off against each other. The Amhara regional administration’s open invitation for negotiations with the Fano forces—following their recent wave of comprehensive, regionwide offensives—further increases the likelihood of this approach.

Regardless of how federal politics unfolds, if the TPLF succeeds in consolidating power internally, and, unlike in the past, adopts a more agile and creative approach, it stands a much stronger chance of securing Tigray’s interests through implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, leading to a return of Tigray’s territory and a return of Tigrayans to their homes.

Footnotes

[1] Some have sought to portray the Pretoria Agreement as both unmerited and a miraculous achievement by the Tigrayan delegation, which salvaged the TDF from annihilation. The ENDF would have inevitably marched into Mekelle. But then what? The TDF, while facing critical shortages in weapon supplies, still boasted vast manpower—more than enough to mount a sustained insurgency. Even if the federal government managed to crush Tigray militarily, it would have bled in the process. And beyond Tigray, Addis would still have had to contend with the growing Fano-Eritrea axis. Keeping the TDF intact, however, served multiple strategic purposes: it curtailed Eritrean influence in the region, weakened the TPLF’s grip, and spared the ENDF from further costly engagements. In the end, the Pretoria Agreement was a pragmatic calculation by Addis

[2] Addis recognized—and feared—the TPLF’s ability to rapidly remobilize, even if the TDF were demobilized. Thus, DDR alone wouldn’t ensure Tigray’s submission; only dismantling the TPLF or placing it under a loyal figure would. The Pretoria Agreement’s call for swift demobilization was largely symbolic, projecting Addis’s triumph. Initially, the federal government tolerated 270,000 Tigrayan combatants remaining in camps as long as Getachew’s side remained in control. In friendly hands, the TDF was an asset that can check any potential threat from Eritrea-Fano. However, its push for accelerated DDR came only when Debretsion’s TPLF threatened to reclaim Tigray.

[3] “Oblivious to many Tigrayans was the fact that the legal anchoring of the TIRA was not based on the Pretoria agreement, but followed constitutional procedures as outlined in the proclamation for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions. This proclamation annuls the constitutional autonomy of Tigray and makes the TIRA accountable to Addis Ababa and not its constituents.”

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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

Main photo: From left to right: Tsadkan Gebretensae, Debretsion Gebremichael, Getachew Reda, and Tadesse Werede, 29 December 2022.

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