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Sexual and Reproductive Violence as Genocide in The Gambia v. Myanmar

[Marianne Crielle G. Vitug is a Legal Fellow at the Global Justice Center (GJC)]

In
January 2026, the International Court of Justice held hearings
on the merits in the case concerning the Application on the Convention Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)
. While the
proceedings are historic in many respects, one notable yet often overlooked
aspect of the case is The Gambia’s arguments on sexual and gender-based
violence (SGBV)
in the commission of genocide by Myanmar’s military forces
against the Rohingya community.

The
ICJ has previously dealt with allegations of SGBV in Bosnia Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro
and
Croatia v. Serbia. In both Bosnia and
Croatia, the ICJ found that SGBV was committed. However, the Court
concluded that these acts were not violations of the Genocide Convention, as
they were not done with the specific intent to destroy the group, in whole or
in part, as required by Article 2 of the Convention. In The Gambia v.
Myanmar
, The Gambia has expressly argued that the acts of SGBV committed
against the Rohingya were done with the specific intent to destroy the group,
in whole or in part, so as to constitute genocide under the Convention. These
arguments take account of the manner in which the Court rejected the
SGBV-related arguments in the earlier cases and encompass the distinct harm of
reproductive violence, which offers significant opportunities for new judicial
findings on SGBV in genocide by the ICJ.

The
Role of SGBV in the ICJ’s Previous Genocide Rulings

The
Gambia’s contentions on SGBV bear notable similarities to and crucial
distinctions from those made in Bosnia and Croatia.

The
provisions relevant to SGBV and invoked in these cases are Articles II(b),
II(c), and II(d), which list acts constituting the actus reus of
genocide. Article II(b) provides that genocide may be committed by causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected group. Article II(c)
pertains to the commission of genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a group in whole or
in part, while Article II(d) covers the commission of genocide by imposing
measures to prevent births within a protected group. Both the actus reus and
dolus specialis (specific intent) must be established in order to make a
finding of genocide.

In Bosnia,
the applicant contended that the systematic rapes committed against Muslim
women were perpetrated as part of the genocide, thus constituting violations of
Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention, which the respondent denied (paras.
298-99). The Court noted that both parties were in agreement that rapes and
sexual violence could constitute acts of genocide if done with the specific
intent to destroy the protected group (para. 299), quoting the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Stakić (para. 300), as well as
noting the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly referring
to sexual violence (paras. 301-03). Despite this, the Court found that it had
not been conclusively established that those atrocities were committed with the
specific intent to destroy the protected group so as to make a finding of
genocide (para. 319).

With
regard to Article II(d), the applicant submitted that rape and sexual violence
against women resulted in physical trauma that impaired their reproductive
functions and even led to infertility (para. 356), that the sexual violence
against men prevented them from procreating (para. 357), and that the Bosnian
Muslim women who were victims of sexual violence might be rejected by their
husbands or unable to find husbands (para. 359). Each of these arguments was
found by the Court to be insufficiently substantiated by evidence, and thus did
not constitute the actus reus of genocide.

With
regard to Article II(e), the applicant contended that “procreative rape”
wherein Muslim women were impregnated with the sperm of Serb males constituted
an act of genocide, as the children born out of these forced pregnancies would
not be considered part of the protected group (para. 362). The Court found that
the applicant failed to establish a policy of forced pregnancy or that there
had been an aim to transfer children of the protected group to another group
(para. 367), and therefore no actus reus was established.

In Croatia,
the Court reiterated that rape and acts of sexual violence may constitute the actus
reus
of genocide under Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention (para.
158). While the Court found that the acts of sexual violence and rape that had
been committed constituted the actus reus of genocide under Article
II(b) (para. 360), it concluded that they were not committed with the necessary
specific intent required to be characterized as acts of genocide (para. 440).

The
Court further stated that rape and sexual violence can also fall within Article
II(c) or II(d) (para. 166). For Article II(d), it is necessary that the
capacity of the members of the group to procreate be affected, and the
systematic nature of the acts must be considered to determine whether genocide
has been committed (para. 166). However, it found that Croatia failed to
establish that such acts were capable of constituting the actus reus of
genocide within the meaning of Article II(c), as they had not been committed at
a scale that would amount to inflicting conditions of life capable of bringing
about a group’s physical destruction (paras. 364 & 394), or Article II(d),
as it was not shown that they were committed in order to prevent births within
the group (para. 400).

The
Court thus rejected the applicants’ arguments relating to SGBV in both cases,
either due to a lack of specific intent to destroy the protected group or a
lack of evidence establishing that a pattern of conduct had existed. 

The
Gambia’s Case
 

In
its arguments, The Gambia contended that the government had established a
“comprehensive legal, administrative and coercive system to reduce and
eliminate the Rohingya in Rakhine State” (Compte Rendu 2026/2, para. 2). This
consisted in, inter alia, enacting the 1962 Citizenship law, which
excluded the Rohingya from the “national races” listed therein in order to pave
the way for mass denationalization and justify the removal of their rights as
citizens (CR 2026/2, paras. 13-20). This later escalated when the Rohingya were
made to obtain marriage permits, observe child limits, and denied birth
registration (CR 2026/2, paras. 21-25). It culminated in their confinement in
camps and ghettos and other severe movement restrictions (CR 2026/2, paras.
25-33).

In
their oral pleadings, The Gambia extensively cited the findings of the United Nations (UN)
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM)
, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights
, and the United States Department of
State
,
and various reports of non-government organizations, which all described
widespread SGBV during the military’s “clearance operations” in the villages of
Min Gyi, Chut Pyin, and Maung Nu, among several other locations.

The Gambia’s Arguments on SGBV

Similar to the applicants in the prior genocide cases, The Gambia’s contentions focused specifically on
how sexual violence evidences genocidal intent under Articles II(b), II(c), and
II(d) of the Genocide Convention. They relied on the findings of the ICTR in Akayesu
to identify five patterns of sexual violence that reveal genocidal intent,
as follows: first, the raping of women and killing their children; second, rape
accompanied by threats to kill, or by killing; third, public and humiliating
violence; fourth, the deliberate targeting of women and girls of reproductive
age, including pregnant women; and fifth, scarring that “brands” survivors (CR
2026/4, para. 4). They argued that all five patterns were fulfilled by Myanmar
in this case.

Integrated into The Gambia’s arguments on sexual violence was the commission of reproductive violence, a form of SGBV that is comprised of:

“intentional acts or omissions that cause harm by interfering with reproductive autonomy and rights, or violence directed at people because of their actual or perceived reproductive capacity.”

The importance of expressly acknowledging reproductive violence as a distinct harm is increasingly recognized among experts, international tribunals, and investigative mechanisms.

The fourth and fifth patterns described above relate
most directly to reproductive violence. The fourth
pattern focuses on reproductive injury brought about by the assaults against
women and girls of reproductive age, which led to miscarriage, infertility, and
trauma (CR 2026/4, para. 10). Many of the
survivors were said to have experienced difficulties in resuming sexual
relations and bearing children as well as fear of marital rejection and social
stigma. The Gambia argued that these attacks are the “measures intended to
prevent births” contemplated in Article II(d), as recognized in Akayesu.

The fifth pattern pertains to the branding of survivors
through acts of violence (CR 2026/4, para. 11).
The Gambia cited reports of the UN FFM and medical professionals on
“distinctive bite marks” found on the cheeks, breasts, and thighs of rape
victims. They emphasized that a “substantial portion” of women and girls were
intentionally branded with these bite marks. Moreover, they referred to other
incidents, such as genital stabbing, cutting off breasts, and other mutilations
that were akin to being “raped to death.”

The Gambia emphasized that these patterns of sexual violence led
to “the destruction of group life.” Victims suffered from long-lasting
emotional, mental, and social consequences. As a result, they were found to be
less likely to marry and procreate, due in large part to stigma and exclusion
as well as the rejection of partners (CR 2026/4, para. 14). More broadly,
these acts intentionally eroded the social fabric of the Rohingya community by
virtue of the ostracism of the survivors, the men’s inability to protect the
women, and the forced reorganization of familial structures (CR 2026/4,
para. 15).

The Gambia’s Taking Account of the ICJ’s Prior Rulings

The
Gambia’s arguments carefully addressed and preempted the manner in which the
Court rejected the SGBV-related arguments in the previous genocide cases.
First, they repeatedly highlighted the presence of a specific intent to destroy
the protected group, in whole or in part, accompanying the acts of rape and
SGBV (CR 2026/4, paras. 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16), in order to characterize them as
genocide. They argued that these acts were “purposefully destructive of the
Rohingya’s physical integrity, reproductive capacity and social cohesion”,
revealing the specific intent required by Articles II(b), II(c), and II(d) (CR
2026/4, para. 18). The Gambia then proceeded to analyze each of these
provisions of the Genocide Convention separately, demonstrating that the alleged
acts, including those of rape and SGBV, were committed with the requisite
specific intent that would qualify them as actus reus in the commission
of genocide (CR 2026/5, paras. 15, 20, 31, 38). They also arguably placed more
intentional emphasis on the reproductive impacts of these acts of sexual
violence, the non-sexual acts of reproductive violence committed, and the
broader societal consequences of these SGBV acts on Rohingya society.

Second,
The Gambia extensively detailed and reiterated the evidence from UN, NGO, and
government reports establishing the pattern of conduct in the commission of
these acts throughout their submissions, in order to avoid a finding that
genocide cannot be established by virtue of insufficient substantiation.

Myanmar’s Responses and Judges’ Questions

Myanmar addressed the
allegations of sexual and reproductive
violence by The Gambia stating that it is “difficult […] to discount the possibility of incidents of serious
sexual assault” (CR 2026/9, para. 12). They acknowledged that such sexual violence cannot form part of legitimate
counter-terrorism operations, and their military forces were not authorized to
conduct any form of sexual violence. However, they alleged that there is no
reliable evidence on its widespread nature (CR 2026/9, paras.
13-14).

Following the first round of oral arguments, nine judges posed questions, two of which
addressed the issue of sexual violence directly. Judge Charlesworth sought
clarification from The Gambia on the locations of the “hundreds of instances”
of sexual violence alleged to have occurred. Judge Charlesworth and Judge ad
hoc
Pillay further noted Myanmar’s concession on the possibility of
incidents of sexual assault, and asked what measures it had taken to
investigate whether such incidents took place and the results of any such
investigations.

In its response to the first question, The Gambia presented a chart demonstrating
that sexual violence had been committed in at least ten village tracts in the
2017 clearance operations, throughout almost the entire northern Rakhine
region, with the UN FFM citing a figure of 1,834 victims (CR 2026/19, paras. 22-24). On the second
question, Myanmar responded by alleging
that judicial investigations into allegations of sexual violence were
progressing slowly because there were no complaints from victims (CR 2026/22, para. 46). However, Myanmar listed certain instances of
investigations that allegedly led to disciplinary action against, or to the
dismissal of, the military personnel involved (CR 2026/22, paras. 47-48).

The Significance of the Case Relating
to SGBV

The
Court’s findings on SGBV in this case could be groundbreaking in two ways. In
terms of the actus reus, this could be the first decision by the ICJ
demonstrating how SGBV can constitute the genocidal acts described in Articles
II(b), II(c), or II(d) of the Genocide Convention. In terms of the dolus
specialis
, the Court could likewise find, as contended by The Gambia, that
SGBV is in itself indicative of genocidal intent in light of the five patterns
described above, the manner in which it was committed, and the targeting of
certain victims by the perpetrators, regardless of the specific
characterization of each act.

The joint intervening States of Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
have
recognized these potential impacts, emphasizing how sexual
violence is a “cornerstone of genocidal campaigns” because of its effects on
women, families, and communities. They explained how the violence may fall under Article II(a), II(b), II(c), or
II(d) of the Genocide Convention. Ireland and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
also highlighted sexual violence as a means of commission of
genocide in their respective submissions. While the intervenors did
not make oral arguments to the Court, their
written submissions demonstrated their
unified appreciation of the magnitude of such a ruling.

At
the same time, both The Gambia and the intervenors
have focused largely on sexual violence, without making significant
distinctions between reproductive violence and
other forms of SGBV. The wording of Articles II(b), II(c), and II(d) shows that
acts of reproductive violence can in themselves constitute violations of these
provisions of the Genocide Convention, regardless of whether or not they
also comprise sexual violence.

How the ICJ will appreciate such arguments on SGBV by The Gambia
is intertwined with other central questions raised in
the case. The Bosnia case provided that
the evidence must be “fully conclusive” to make a finding of genocide
(para. 319), while the Croatia case
established a standard of genocide being the “only reasonable inference” in
light of the facts of the case (para. 417),
both stringent standards that are difficult to
meet. Moreover, Myanmar has repeatedly questioned the probative value of the
UN, NGO, and government reports cited by The Gambia (despite its own reliance
on some of these reports), and the ICJ’s evaluation of their reliability will
be crucial to the finding that genocide was committed through SGBV.

In conclusion, it is clear that SGBV has consistently been utilized as a weapon in the commission of mass atrocities. A landmark finding that acts of SGBV – and reproductive violence in particular – were committed with the requisite dolus specialis in The Gambia v. Myanmar would certainly be consequential in the ICJ’s pending and future cases concerning the application of the Genocide Convention.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank GJC’s Legal Adviser Ashita Alag and Senior Legal Adviser Grant Shubin for their valuable contributions and GJC Executive Director Elise Keppler for her review and Kristen Adolf for her research assistance.

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