Reassessing Al-Shabaab’s Influence: How exaggerated threats hinder Somalia’s progress
Addis Abeba –This article is a rebuttal to the recent op-ed published in Addis Standard, titled “Beyond Denial: Why downplaying Al-Shabaab’s growing influence in Somalia is dangerous,” by Adam Daud Ahmed. His piece was a response to my earlier article, “Countering Alarmist Narratives: Debunking Al-Shabaab’s perceived ‘power grab’ in Somalia.” While scholarly debate is valued, it is essential to correct the persistent mischaracterization of the Somali situation presented by the author. His arguments consistently inflate the threat posed by Al-Shabaab while neglecting the substantial advancements achieved by the federal government of Somalia and its international partners. This critique aims to delineate the inaccuracies within Ahmed’s analysis and offer a more balanced assessment of Somalia’s security and governance dynamics.
The author’s central argument posits Al-Shabaab’s trajectory towards a “power grab,” substantiated by alleged territorial gains in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. While acknowledging Al-Shabaab’s resurgence in specific locales, the assertion of an imminent national takeover lacks analytical rigor. Emphasizing the counterproductivity of inflated threat assessments, such narratives foster an environment of fear that ultimately benefits the insurgent group. Alarmist framing risks inadvertently bolstering Al-Shabaab’s perceived invincibility, thereby undermining public confidence in state institutions and security initiatives.
Rather than a comprehensive power seizure, Al-Shabaab’s activities more accurately reflect guerrilla warfare tactics, wherein transient territorial control serves strategic posturing rather than long-term administrative governance. The group lacks the capacity to effectively govern major urban centers, such as Mogadishu, and while parallel governance structures exist, they are predominantly coercive, lacking organic local acceptance.
Furthermore, Ahmed’s analysis overlooks significant milestones in Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts. Since June 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has executed a robust offensive, liberating key towns and strategic territories. The tripartite counterterrorism strategy—military operations, financial disruption, and ideological counter-extremism—has demonstrably weakened the group’s operational efficacy. The sustained absence of major terrorist attacks in Mogadishu for three consecutive years (2023-2025) attests to the efficacy of Somalia’s national defense strategy.
To illustrate this military progress, consider Operation Black Lion, which resulted in the liberation of key supply routes in the Hiraan region during late 2024. This operation significantly disrupted Al-Shabaab’s logistical capabilities. Reports indicate a 30% reduction in Al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct large-scale attacks in the following quarter, as reported by ATMIS. Furthermore, the number of Al-Shabaab-controlled districts has been reduced by 70% in the last year. These metrics, alongside detailed after-action reports, provide concrete evidence of the government’s advances.
Balancing Somalia’s Security Challenges, Structural Reforms
The author accurately identifies Somalia’s security vulnerabilities, particularly the Somali National Army’s (SNA) reliance on external support for territorial retention. However, his critique neglects ongoing security sector reforms aimed at mitigating these deficiencies. While challenges persist, the government’s approach should be recognized as a pragmatic strategy for incremental stabilization, not mere “sugarcoating.”
The assertion that military gains are “temporary” is misleading. While setbacks are inevitable, they should not overshadow the progress achieved through coordinated military efforts with ATMIS, international partners, and local militias. The restructuring of Somalia’s security apparatus, notably through military training programs supported by Turkey, the UAE, and the U.S., illustrates a commitment to sustainable national defense.
Moreover, the writer appears to disregard the decade-long stabilization initiatives undertaken by the FGS. The National Transformation Plan (NTP) (2025-2029), the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), and the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+) provide structured frameworks for building a peaceful, stable, and secure Somalia through political dialogue, trust-building, and sustainable local governance. These programs ensure that military gains are translated into enduring stability. The 2023 lifting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) arms embargo has further bolstered Somalia’s counterterrorism capabilities through the acquisition of advanced military equipment.
The claim that the federal government of Somalia is distracted by issues such as Somaliland while Al-Shabaab advances is overly simplistic.”
In liberated areas, the government, with the backing of international partners, has launched numerous stabilization projects aimed at improving economic and social indicators. Infrastructure development, employment opportunities, private sector growth, and economic diversification are being prioritized. Similarly, access to education, healthcare services, community resilience, and poverty reduction are being addressed. These initiatives are part of a broader strategy to rebuild governance, enhance security, and support local communities.
Governance vs. Military Strategy
Ahmed’s critique of Somalia’s governance deficiencies is valid, emphasizing the necessity of a robust political foundation to complement military successes. However, this must be contextualized within Somalia’s broader state-building endeavors.
The claim that the federal government is distracted by issues such as Somaliland while Al-Shabaab advances is overly simplistic. Somalia’s governance challenges are multifaceted, requiring a balanced approach to diplomatic negotiations, economic development, and security. The assertion that focusing on Somaliland undermines counterterrorism efforts ignores the complex realities of governance.
Somalia has made significant diplomatic and governance strides, including achieving debt relief through the IMF and World Bank’s HIPC Initiative, reducing external debt from 64% of GDP in 2018 to 6% in 2023. The nation’s election to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council underscores international confidence in its governance and state-building progress. Addressing the Somaliland issue is crucial for overall stability. Diplomatic progress in this area can reduce regional tensions, preventing Al-Shabaab from exploiting potential instability. A stable and unified Somalia is less vulnerable to extremist influence. Successful diplomatic engagement with Somaliland would also free up more government resources to be used in the fight against Al-Shabaab.
Tackling Al-Shabaab’s Parallel Governance Structures
Al-Shabaab’s provision of governance functions in rural areas presents a significant challenge. However, this should not be equated with legitimate governance. Governance under duress, characterized by coercive taxation and militant-administered justice, is unsustainable.
The solution lies in enhancing state presence in liberated areas. While immediate governance solutions are ideal, they are impractical without a phased approach. The FGS’s Wadajir Framework for Local Governance and the District Peace and Stability Committees (DPSCs) are crucial tools for reinforcing localized governance structures that can challenge Al-Shabaab’s control. While Al-Shabaab establishes parallel governance structures, these are fundamentally coercive and unsustainable. Local populations often resist their harsh taxation and judicial practices.
Reports from human rights organizations document widespread discontent and instances of local resistance. Furthermore, their inability to provide consistent basic services, especially during natural disasters, highlights the fragility of their control. Information from local citizen journalists and NGO reports shows that Al-Shabaab’s justice system is often brutal and arbitrary.
While acknowledging the risks of dependency, continued international partnerships remain essential during Somalia’s transition to self-reliance.
The author’s recommendation for “community-based counterterrorism programs” aligns with the government’s strategy. However, a purely civilian-focused approach without security interventions risks exacerbating the insurgency. Counterterrorism necessitates a dual approach: military suppression alongside grassroots engagement.
Exaggerated threat assessments can serve as recruitment tools for Al-Shabaab, granting them undue credibility.”
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s request for Turkish military aid is strategic, aimed at enhancing the SNA’s capabilities in key areas such as aerial surveillance and heavy artillery. This support is intended to accelerate the transition to Somali self-reliance by strengthening the SNA’s capacity to hold liberated territories. The Turkish aid is also aimed at training more Somali national army members. The long-term goal is for the Somali national army to be able to operate without the need for outside military support.
Framing Policy Narrative: Denial or Strategic Communication?
The writer’s assertion that Somalia’s leadership must acknowledge Al-Shabaab’s growing influence overlooks the distinction between denial and strategic communication. Exaggerated threat assessments can serve as recruitment tools for Al-Shabaab, granting them undue credibility. The government’s cautious approach aims to manage public perception responsibly while addressing security concerns pragmatically.
Somalia’s National Stabilization Strategy, operating on a horizontal coordination platform, aligns government agencies and international partners effectively. The framework prioritizes governance as a core element of stabilization, ensuring that security gains translate into sustainable peace. There’s a critical distinction between denial and strategic communication. Denial involves ignoring or minimizing a threat. Strategic communication, on the other hand, involves acknowledging the threat while managing public perception to avoid panic and Al-Shabaab propaganda. The government’s approach is to provide accurate information while emphasizing its ongoing efforts and progress. By providing regular updates and information on the progress of the war, the government is practicing strategic communication.
Conclusion
While Adam Daud Ahmed raises valid concerns, his op-ed leans heavily on alarmist rhetoric, which risks reinforcing instability. This analysis provides a balanced counter-narrative, acknowledging threats while advocating for a measured and strategic approach.
Policy discourse should prioritize pragmatic counterterrorism, governance, and security sector reform, rather than framing Al-Shabaab’s resurgence as an inevitable “power grab.” Sustainable peace requires a coordinated effort integrating military efforts, governance enhancement, and community engagement.
A responsible policy approach necessitates a strategic balance between security interventions, governance reforms, and community resilience-building, avoiding both exaggerated threats and understated challenges. While the government has made significant progress, I also acknowledge the severity of the situation.
Al-Shabaab remains a formidable threat, and the security landscape is fragile. The government is committed to a sustained and comprehensive approach, recognizing that this is a long-term struggle. The regional implications are significant, and the government is working closely with partners like the AU and IGAD to coordinate efforts and address cross-border threats. AS
Abdinasir Ali Osman (Prof.) is a senior researcher, consultant, and trainer based in Mogadishu, Somalia, with more than 35 years of experience in the humanitarian, development, and institutional capacity-building sectors. He can be reached at [email protected]
Crédito: Link de origem